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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion for a new trial? 
2. Are the orders appealed from invalid because they fail 
to meet the statutory requirements of procedure and 
substance? 
3. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to enter the 
orders being appealed? 
4. Is the final order being appealed invalid for lack of 
constitutional due process? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was tried for theft in October of 1982 and 
a guilty verdict was entered (R. 165). A sentencing hearing 
was held on November 26, 1982/ at which time the defendant 
presented his motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment 
(R. 171-183). The transcript of that hearing has been lost 
and the only written record is an unsigned minute entry 
(R. 185). The pertinent part of the minute entry is the 
last paragraph, which reads as follows: 
Defendant sentenced this time as follows: 
Term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed 
five years, fined 5,000.00. Fine and prison 
sentence stayed and the Defendant is placed 
on probation for 2 years. Defendant is to 
work for the Utah County Sanity Administration 
one day a week for 50 weeks, with no charge to 
Utah County or to the State of Utah. Restitu-
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tion shall be as determined in the Civil law 
suit re: Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. 
Defendant is on stiff probation for two years 
and is not to use liquor, drugs, or make any 
violation of the law during that period. Crime 
charged "theft by deception" is reduced to a 
Third Degree Felony", Work arrangements shall 
be arranged through the Sanity Administration 
by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office. 
Defendant entered into a Probation Agreement dated December 1, 
1982. (A copy is included in the Addendum. Reference to the 
Probation Agreement is made in the District Court!s Order 
extending probation (R. 193-194) and in the report of the 
probation officer to the Court (R. 227-228.) 
No written judgment, order, or sentence was entered at 
that time, and the Defendant, incorrectly believing that the 
minute entry constituted the "final judgment" filed a notice 
of appeal in December of 1982 (R. 186). Neither the Attorney 
General nor the Supreme Court noticed the lack of the entry 
of a sentencing order as required by Section 77-35-22(c), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). The Utah Supreme Court issued its 
opinion on June 25, 1984 (R. 202-208) affirming the District 
Court. Re-hearing was denied on October 2, 1984 (R. 201). 
Defendant's appeal was based on four points of error, 
one of which was that the District Court allowed the jury to 
take a deposition of the Defendant with them into their 
deliberations (Exhibit P-l). The Defendant was not aware of 
that error until he was preparing his appellate brief, and 
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the "commission of the 
asserted error" (R. 208) but deemed it waived due to the 
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"absence of a proper and seasonable objection11 (R. 208) to 
the District Court. 
On November 26, 1984 the District Court entered an Order 
extending Defendant's probation to April 1, 1985 (R. 193-194). 
On November 10, 1984 the Defendant filed motions in the District 
Court to amend the minute entry dated November 26, 1982 to 
correct some errors therein, and to amend the original motions 
for a new trial and for arrest of judgment based on the jury 
taking the deposition with them into their deliberations. 
(These motions are included in the Addendum. Judge Tibbs, 
being in the Sixth Judicial District, maintains his own personal 
file there (R. 248). These motions are most likely in that file 
and were not returned with the regular court file to Utah County. 
There is adequate reference to these motions in the documents 
setting up the hearing in Manti (R. 210-211) and the minute 
entry of the hearing on the motions (R. 212-215) and the court 
Order resulting from that hearing on the motions (R. 232-234).) 
On January 30, 1985 a hearing on Defendant's motions 
was held before the District Court. The Judge refused to 
amend the minute entry on the grounds that it did not consti-
tute the order of the Court and could not be relied upon to 
accurately reflect the Court's verbal order (R. 212). He 
also denied Defendant's motion to amend the original motions 
for a new trial and for arrest of judgment. The deputy county 
attorney was ordered to prepare the order for this ruling and 
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to obtain a transcript of the November 26, 1982 hearing so 
that an accurate sentencing order could be prepared. (No 
one was aware at that time that the court reporter's notes 
had been lost. ) 
The deputy county attorney, Mr. Killpack, shortly 
thereafter left the county attorney's office for employment 
in another county office and the orders for the hearings on 
November 26, 1982 and January 30, 1985 were not prepared or 
timely filed. In mid-July, 1985, it came to Mr. Killpack's 
attention that he had neglected to prepare those orders and 
he drafted the two orders along with his affidavit indicating 
that the transcript could not be found for the hearing on 
November 26, 1982, and that his draft order was prepared from 
his own recollection and from the unsigned minute entry. (Se& 
cover letter sent to Judge Tibbs in Addendum dated July 17, 
1985. ) 
The copies of the proposed orders and affidavit were 
sent to the Defendant in Provo, mailed from Provo, on July 22, 
1985 (R. 231, 234, 238). The copies of the proposed orders 
were sent from Provo to Judge Tibbs in Manti, Utah, along 
with an affidavit dated July 19, 1985 (R. 230) and a cover 
letter dated July 17, 1985 (See copy in the Addendum). There 
is no proof of the date or time of mailing to Judge Tibbs, 
but it could not have been after the mailing to the Defendant, 
because the proposed orders were signed by Judge Tibbs in Manti 
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on July 23, 1985 (R. 233, 237). 
Defendant filed his objections to the proposed orders 
on July 31, 1985 (R. 216-224) and a hearing was held on 
October 1, 1985 (R. 226). In the meantime, the proposed 
orders, that had been signed, were held and not entered. 
At the hearing, the District Court decided to enter the 
two proposed orders and to deny Defendant's renewed motions 
for a new trial and arrest of judgment (R. 239-245). The 
Court also decided to terminate probation, except for resti-
tution, and to hold a restitution hearing on October 28, 1985 
to satisfy the objections of the Defendant. 
Judge Tibbs decided that he did not want to take testi-
mony at the restitution hearing, so he clearly specified as 
part of his Order on October 1, 1985 (R. 243-245) that the 
County Attorney must establish its claim for restitution by 
documentation which is supported by affidavits, and that the 
County Attorney must furnish copies of its documentation to 
the Defendant within fifteen (15) days from the date of the 
hearing to give sufficient time for the Defendant to prepare 
his counter documentation before the restitution hearing on 
October 28, 1985. 
No documentation or affidavits were presented to the 
Defendant prior to the restitution hearing. At the hearing 
the deputy county attorney presented documentation to support 
her claims, but with no affidavits as previously specified 
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by the Court. The Court also indicated that he had received 
a letter from one of the victim's civil attorneys and a phone 
call from the attorney of the other victim, but the deputy 
county attorney told the Judge that both of those attorneys 
had told her that they didn't consider it worth their time to 
prepare affidavits to substantiate their claims. The Defendant 
objected to the introduction of the Statefs documents, but was 
overruled and was allowed to introduce some documentation to 
counter the State's documents, although he had no advance notice 
of what the State was going to present. 
The District Court ordered Defendant to pay 73,461.45 in 
restitution, retroactive to November 26, 1982, (See copy of the 
proposed order in the Addendum) but up to this point the order 
has not been entered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant argues that he has now complied with the 
requirement of making a proper challenge in the District 
Court to the reversible error of the jury taking the deposition 
into its deliberations. The District Court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Defendant also argues that the post-conviction orders entered 
by the District Court are invalid and violative of Defendant's 
rights because they fail to conform to the procedural, statutory, 
and constitutional requirements of the criminal proceedings. 
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IE NTS 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT»q AMENDED MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL, 
J . . L . U U L U i i , if 
Utah Hules ..:. ^ L U I H I M . procedure, the Murt may "grant a nov; 
~ri ) ' • nterest -'•!" ' M S M "IO i :' i h?ie ib h ?rror ui 
, . : a L - ' ^ » u j . ,j;erse e;. rect upon the 
rights of a party 'he j 1 i1 y , i n taking thtJ deposition into 
i I I* 1 i I'M i 11 i i 11 i ,i t n error wl i:i c 
effect on t.ie Defendant. 
When i_ ,^ r- L o^ ) pi -i rgumon t •- \vere f i n i she^ , t- he 3a i 1 i f f took 
tl: ie ] i :i i: } ":t . a . J i.. . . .... , '.neir J e i i oer a 11 ons . 
This is shown by the minute en' ry of the Clerk and by the trans-
.,ie mi^xuv.. enti^ OL tne proceedings of the trial as kept 
by -.he Clert, rec^ru- the following applicable e^^nt^: 
"Arcjuiiiciiua c o n c i u u e u , t n e u e J_ ^ n b c a J i a j ' . j c e 
counsel approached the bench and out of jury 
hearing said motion, the Defendant renewed its 
motion for mistrial. Motion denied. The Case 
is submitted to the jury at t'ms time. Bailiff 
Willis Vincent took, the jury to lunch j r . : -
time, and admonished to keep the jury tugecne:. 
Jury is to jo directly to jury room to 
ae 1 i bera te a r te r i u m: b hour „ rnx i 1 J f f s i,er e sworrJ :.n . 
"Delioer i: ^  .• - ' -j : i 
"At 8 : 0 0 [J . ITK , t n e j u r y was r e t u r n e d t o t h e 
r v ; r !• r . ^ n m J »- r o t - * i « i . » ' -. , i ' ^ P T ^ i O P " ^ ~" " 
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hours) Clerk called the roll and all jurors 
were present. Jury Foreman, Alan C. Cameron, 
stated the jury had reached a verdict." 
The transcript of the proceedings of the trial as re-
corded by the Court Reporter record the following events: 
THE COURT: The record should indicate we1re 
outside the presence of the jury. 
MR. STANGER; 
THE COURT: 
; Your Honor, I would again make a 
motion for a mistrial on the basis 
that on four different occasions on 
the grounds that the Prosecutor is 
telling the jury of the fiduciary 
duty by lawyers and their clients. 
Well, your motion is denied. The Court 
feels that this is proper argument. 
MR. STANGER: Thank you. 
(After the matter was argued to the Court and jury 
by both sides, the jury retired to the jury room 
for the determination of a verdict.) 
(Whereupon a rollcall was made of the jury and all 
the jurors were present.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, have you reached 
a verdict? 
FOREMAN: We have. 
The deposition marked Exhibit P-l was taken into the 
deliberations of the jury and weighed heavily in reaching a 
verdict, as shown in the affidavit of a member of the jury 
attached to Defendant's motion in the Addendum. 
Taking depositions into the jury room during deliberations 
is prohibited by statute in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
"Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury 
may take with the the instructions of the 
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court and i_l exhibits and papers which have 
been received as evidence, except depostions; 
and each juror may also take with him any 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings 
taken by himself, but not taken by any other 
person. (emphasis added.) (Sectio n 7 7 3 5 ] 7 ( k ) , 
Utah Code Ann. ( 1953)) . 
The basis .. :/._ ..utu'-i . ^; .-.:. • ; 
1 a \, i. n U t a:. f or nor ^  \- h dM Z o r t y y e a r .->. . n State v. Solomon , 
: " .
E
: '" ";r eme Coui t 
C i i s o i u ^ u i d n j u a e p o a n i u i u if . J I ue i i i y ' 'documentary e v i d e n c e " . 
The Court - i i c* r 
reporter, transcribed and certified, is not 
documentary evidence to oe r^ce-v^d in writing 
and jiven : • ' - ; . . " 
The reasoninq of L 11 >j "our t In the So] onion case is set 
for tl: i :)! I page 8 ] 1 I 
"A written instrument, made an exhibit in 
the cause but not consisting of testimony 
of a witness in the case, may of course be 
taken to the jury room the same as maps, 
diagrams, and other exhibits. But the 
testimony of a witness is in a different 
category. Such is t h e p ro v i s io n o f t h e 
statutes and the common law always excluded 
depositions and written testimony from being 
c a rri e d f ro m t h e b a r b y t h e j u ry . We c a n see 
no reason why the court should depart from 
the well established rule. It may often 
happen that the testimony on one side is oral 
from witnesses produced before the jury, while 
the testimony for the other side on essential 
matters is in the form., of depositions or in 
the transcript from, testimony at a previous 
hearing, If the hearing lasts for any length 
of time and the jury takes the depositions or 
transcript to be read and discussed whi le the 
oral evidence contra has in measure faded from 
the memory of the jurors, it is obvious that the 
side sustained by written, evidence is given an 
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undue advantage. The law does not permit 
depositions or witnesses to go to the jury 
room. Why should a witness be permitted to 
go there in the form of written testimony?11 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
The fact situation in this case falls squarely within 
the example discussed in the Solomon case. The evidence by 
the State included the deposition which went to the jury 
deliberations, whereas the evidence by the Defendant was oral 
and none of it went with the jury in written testimony. As 
the Utah Supreme Court said, "it is obvious that the side 
(the State in this case) sustained by written evidence is given 
an undue advantage.11 It is likely that the jury might have 
reached a different verdict if they had not had the deposition 
with them for five and a half hours in deliberations. By any 
interpretation, the Defendant failed to receive a fair trial 
and the error is reversible. 
The facts of this case, as described in the minute entry 
of the Clerk and the transcript of proceedings by the Court 
Reporter, cited above, show that there was also error and 
impropriety in the way the Court failed to control the issu-
ance of the exhibits to the jury as they went into deliberations. 
The Court chose to recess the proceedings and send the jury to 
lunch immediately prior to the commencement of their delibera-
tions. The State and the Defendant were both justified under 
the circumstances to assume that the Court would either take 
personal supervision or properly instruct the Bailiff, in the 
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Judge's anticipated absence, to make sure that Rule 17(k) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was properly complied 
with, in that the jury was to be given the instructions of the 
court and all of the exhibits and papers which were received 
in evidence, but to exclude the depositions. The failure of 
the Court to responsibly handle its duty at a time when the 
proceedings were in recess and the parties were not present 
to personally observe which items were given to the jury, not 
only resulted in the error by the jury, but it also denied the 
Defendant of due process in this case at a critical time when 
actions were taken and decisions made which could and did 
result in a detriment to him. 
Another error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant was in the 
way the Court handled the request by the jury that they be 
given a copy of Defendant's testimony. The record in this case 
includes a short note on a small piece of paper, signed by the 
jury foreman, requesting that the jury be given a copy of 
Defendant's testimony (R. 132). The Court denied the request, 
not in the presence of the parties or their Counsel, and told 
the jury to use their best memory, and then directed the 
Clerk to attach the note to the jury instructions in the 
Court's file. The court record gives no other indication that 
the parties were notified of the request by the jury or the 
response by the Court, or that the parties had access to the 
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Court's file after this incident and prior to the verdict 
by the jury. While the procedure followed by the Court may be 
allowable under the Rules, the request by the jury should have 
alerted the Court that the jury had some sort of document, 
such as the deposition, to which it was giving serious consid-
eration, and the jury wanted to also consider that Defendant's 
explanation in written form. This is a fact which the Judge 
knew, or should have known at that point, but which he failed 
to disclose to the Defendant. This also resulted in a lack of 
due process for the Defendant and for which the Defendant should 
have been made aware. 
It is likely that the outcome of this case might have 
been different and in the Defendant's favor if these errors 
and improprieties had not been allowed to occur. In the 
interest of justice a new trial should be granted because of 
the substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant. 
In the District Court proceedings the State objected on 
the grounds that Section 77-35-24(c), Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, limits the time 
within which a motion for a new trial may be made. It says: 
"A motion for a new trial shall be made within ten days after 
imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the 
Court may fix during the ten-day period." Appellant has no 
argument with the rule, but it is wellestablished law in the 
State of Utah and elsewhere that statements made by the trial 
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judge are not the sentence and judgment of the case, and it 
is only the signed order that prevails. State v. Gerrard, 
Utah, 584 P.2d 885 (1978); U. S. v. Coleman, 9th Circuit 688 
F.2d 663 (1982); State v. Sawyer, 54 Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919); 
McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952); 
Newton v. State Road Commission, 23 Utah 2d 350 463 P.2d 565 
(1970). Therefore, the imposition of sentence did not occur 
until October 2, 1985 when the order was entered by the clerk. 
This was almost one year after Defendant's motion was filed 
on November 10, 1984. 
It is also clear by the wording of the Order of Sentence 
that was entered October 2, 1985 (R. 235-238) that the trial 
judge intended to suspend the imposition of sentence on Nov-
ember 26, 1982. Section 76-3-201(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
lists the categories to which a Defendant may be sentenced. 
They include imprisionment, fine, and probation. Section 77-
18-1(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as it read on November 26, 
1982 said, 
"On a . . . conviction of any crime or offense, 
if it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court may suspend the imposition or 
execution of sentence and place the defendant 
on probation for such period of time as 
it determines." 
In the Order of Sentence in this case the Defendant is 
"sentenced to imprisonment" in paragraph no. 2 and "ordered 
to pay a fine" in paragraph no. 3. In paragraph no. 4 it says, 
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"The fine and prison sentence are both stayed and the defend-
and is placed on probation • . . . ,f There is no sentencing 
to probation. Section 77-35-22, Utah Code Ann. (1953), Rule 
22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with the procedure 
to be followed in sentencing, and Subsection (d) says, 
"When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall 
issue its commitment setting forth the sentence." Since no 
order of "commitment" was issued or intended, it is clear 
that the trial judge did not "impose" a prison sentence. 
Since imposition of sentence was suspended, there was no ten-
day time limit within which the Defendant had to file his 
motion for a new trial to avoid waiving that opportunity. 
Several cases also make it clear that an order of probation 
does not constitute an imposition of sentence. Bracey v. State, 
Fla.App. 356 So.2d 72 (1978). If there is an imposition of 
sentence it is not within the power of the court to reduce 
the time to be served, State v. Schreuder, Utah, 25 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13 (1985), and therefore there can be no probation 
ordered by the court. 
There is also nothing in Section 77-35-24, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which limits 
the imposition of sentence to just one occasion. The cases 
consider a reduction of sentence, a corrected sentence, a 
second sentence, and an amended sentence all as an imposition 
of sentence. In this case, the trial judge originally left 
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uncertain the amount of restitution to be paid by the Defend-
ant. When that amount was made certain, it could be classi-
fied as an imposition of sentence if the original order were 
also classified as an imposition of sentence. In fact, three 
of the four orders being appealed herein are called an "order 
of sentence.11 Therefore, the motion for a new trial made on 
November 10, 1984 was made prior to the ten-day time limit 
following the second and third imposition of sentence. 
POINT II: THE TWO ORDERS FILED OCTOBER 2, 1985 ARE INVALID 
BECAUSE THEY DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE 2.9 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT 
COURTS. 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah is applicable in this 
instance because Rule 3.1 of the same Rules clearly states, 
"These rules shall govern the practice and 
procedure in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah in all matters 
not specifically covered by the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure or Rules of Criminal 
Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court." 
Rule 2.9(a) says: 
"In all rulings by a court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment or decree 
in conformity with the ruling." 
No provision is made for extending the time within which a 
proposed order may be filed. 
Rule 2.9(b) also says, 
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"Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, 
and/or Orders shall be served on opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall 
be submitted to the court and counsel within 
five (5) days after service.11 
Mr. Killpackfs letter from the County Attorney's office to 
the court is dated the 17th of July, 1985 and the mailing 
certificates show that such mailings to counsel were not made 
until the 22nd of July. There is nothing to indicate that such 
mailings to counsel were prior to the mailing to the court, 
and it is doubtful that they were because Judge Tibbs signed 
the orders in Manti on July 23rd. 
In at least four recent Utah cases, the law has been 
clearly established that "compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is nec-
essary in order that a judgment be properly 'filed1 . . . " 
Biqelow v. Inqersoll, Utah, 618 P.2d 50 (1980); Larsen v. Larsen, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 116 (1983); Tolboe Construction v. Staker Paving, 
Utah, 682 P.2d 843 (1984), Garff v. Richards, Utah, 706 P.2d 
1065 (1985). 
In the above-entitled case, neither the requirements of 
2.9 (a) nor 2.9(b) were met by the County Attorney's office. 
A proposed order was not filed within fifteen (15) days after 
the November 26, 1982 hearing, and again following the January 
30,1985 hearing, when the court made it clear in its order that 
counsel for the State was to prepare an Order for the hearing 
on November 26, 1982, still no orders were prepared until July 
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of 1985. When those orders were prepared, they did not meet 
the requirements for service as outlined in Rule 2.9(b), 
as discussed above. 
POINT III: ALL FOUR OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED ARE 
INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT MEET THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR SENTENCING. 
Section 76-3-201, Utah Code Ann. (1953), sets out very 
specific requirements that must be met when the sentencing 
court orders restitution. Those requirements have not been 
met in any of the four orders. 
The court must first make a finding that there are 
pecuniary damages suffered by the victim. Pecuniary damages 
can only include special damages and not general or punitive 
damages, which may be included in a civil judgment. The court 
must also limit those pecuniary damages to the amount that the 
victim could actually recover in a civil action against the 
defendant. 
If the court finds such pecuniary damages, he must make 
his reasons a part of the court record as to why restitution 
is appropriate or is not appropriate. He must also show that 
he has taken into consideration several specific items which 
are listed in the statute. 
If the Defendant objects to imposition of restitution 
the amount, or the distribution of restitution, which this 
Defendant did, the Court must allow the Defendant a full 
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hearing on the issue of restitution at the time of sentencing. 
These requiremtns have not been met, and therefore, the 
written orders do not meet the statutory requirements if the 
order for restitution is to be included. 
POINT IV: ALL FOUR OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED ARE 
INVALID BECAUSE THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT TO MAKE SUCH ORDERS HAD 
ALREADY TERMINATED. 
There is a written order of the Court in the file which 
extends the period of probation to April 1, 1985. The State's 
failure to enter a subsequent written order making any further 
extensions of the probation period prior to April 1, 1985, 
allowed the probationary period and the court's jurisdiction 
to terminate as a matter of law. 
The District Court was even without jurisdiction to 
extend the period of probation to April 1, 1985. The 1984 
amendment to Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953), provides 
that following eighteen (18) months of compliance with the 
terms of probation, then probation is automatically terminated 
as a matter of law. Since the written order of the Court had 
not been filed prior to the effective date of the amendment, 
March 23, 1984, this case is governed by the amendment, and 
therefore, probation and jurisdiction have terminated as a 
matter of law. The amendment makes no provision for the 
extension of probation by the District Court. 
- 20 -
The date of Defendant's Probation Agreement is 
December 1, 1982. Eighteen months following that date 
would be June 1, 1984, which was several months prior to 
the District Court's extension of probation to April 1, 1985. 
If the eighteen months has to run from the effective date of 
the amendment, which was March 23, 1984, then probation was 
terminated as a matter of law on September 23, 1985, which was 
prior to the entry of any of the four orders being appealed. 
POINT V: THE ORDER OF THE HEARING ON OCTOBER 28, 1985 
IS INVALID FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS. 
At the hearing on October 1, 1985, the order of the 
court clearly set out the notice of the procedure to be 
followed in the restitution hearing to be held on October 28, 
1985. The county attorney's office was to furnish all documents 
bearing on*the victims' restitution claims to the Defendant 
within fifteen days after October 1, 1985. These documents 
were all to be certified to by affidavits as to their accuracy. 
This was to give the Defendant adequate notice to prepare any 
legal basis he had for disagreeing with the amounts and documents. 
The record shows that no documents were fucnished to 
the Defendant prior to the hearing on October 28, 1985, and no 
affidavits were presented to the court verifying the accuracy 
of the documents and restitution amounts claimed. It also 
shows that the court accepted a letter from civil counsel 
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of one of the victims and a phone call from counsel of another 
victim and included those as part of the basis for making his 
decision as to the amount of restitution. 
The Defendant had no adequate notice of the procedure 
which the District Court Judge followed at the restitution 
hearing, he had no adequate notice of the documents presented 
by the State as the basis of restitution, and he was not allowed 
to present testimony in defense of his position because of the 
restrictions given by the Court in the Order of October 1, 1985. 
Such lack of notice and of opportunity to fully respond is a 
denial of due process afforded to the Defendant by the Utah 
State Constitution, Article I, Section 7 and by the U. S. Consti-
tution, 5th and 14th Amendments. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks to have his guilty verdict reversed and 
the case either dismissed or remanded for a new trial based 
on the reversible error of the jury taking the deposition with 
them into their deliberations. In the alternative, appellant 
seeks to have the sentencing orders declared invalid due to 
lack of jurisdiction, failure to conform to procedural and 
substantive requirements and lack of due process, and bo have 
the case remanded for new sentencing. 
ADDENDUM 
The following pages contain the copies relevant to this brief 
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terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack 
upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the 
use of force which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent 
and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by 
stealth, and h e reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or 
offering personal violence to any person, dwelling, 
or being in the habitation and he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent the 
assault or offer o f personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is 
made or attempted for the purpose o f committing a 
felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the purpose 
of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reas-
onably and had a reasonable fear o f imminent peril 
of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or 
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or 
attempted by use o f force, or in a violent and turn* 
ultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. was 
76-2-606. Force ia defease of property. 
A person is justified in using force, other than 
deadly force, against another when and to the 
extent that be reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate criminal interfere-
nce with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member o f his 
immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he hat 
a legal duty to protect. i*TO 
Chapter 3. Punishments 
i of Off earn. Ptftl. 
fWllo 
Part 3. Flats tad Spirit! 
Put 4. f fwitliiii ttrt Ipfirlai rmihloai oa 
Part 1. Classification of Offenses 
76-3-101. Seateadag in 
(1) A person adjudged guilty of an offense under 
this code shall be sentenced in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. 
(2) Penal laws enacted after the effective date of 
this code shall be classified for sentencing purposes 
in accordance with this chapter. wn 
7*4-162. Derigaatioa of offeasea. 
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeano-
rs, or infractions. i*n 
764-103. Felonies classified. 
(1) Felonies are classified into four categories: 
(a) Capital felonies; 
(b) Felonies o f the first degree; 
(c) Felonies o f the second degree; 
(d) Felonies o f the third degree. 
(2) An offense designated as a felony either in 
this code or ia another law, without specification as 
to punishment or category, is a felony of the third 
lfis 
7 0 4 - 1 0 4 . Misdemeanors classified. 
(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three catego-
ries: 
(a) Class A misdemeanors; 
(b) Class B misdemeanors; 
(c) Class C misdemeanors. 
(2) A n offense designated a misdemeanor, either 
i a this code or in another law, without specification 
as to punishment or category, is a class B misdeme-
anor. 1971 
76-3-103. Infraction*. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) A n y offense which is an infraction within this 
code is expressly designated and any offense defined 
outside this code which is not designated as a felony 
or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is 
specified is an infraction. 1973 
Part 2. Sentencing 
ascdoa of atfaa*. 
764-261.2. Ovi actio* by 
764-202* FsfOMd parsons • 
•tateaot - That served oa 
of partem 
764-263. Felony eoavktftea 
isoaaaat - firrtaa of 
763-264. M l i i i i m 
at. 
764-206. IsfracaaaceavictkNi - Flat, forfdtare, aad aa» 
764-206. Capital Mewy • Death or life i 
764-267, Capital fetes? - Statteclag orocwMig 
764-260.1 
76-3-201. Sentences or 
allowed-Ova" 
AfjravatJoa or mitigation of 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a 
court may sentence a person adjudged guilty o f an 
offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of such sentences: 
(a) to pay a fine; or 
(b) to removal from and/or disqualification o f 
public or private office; or 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically 
provided by law; or 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2) This chapter shall not deprive a court of 
authority conferred by law to forfeit property, 
dissolve a corporation, suspend, or cancel a license 
o r permit removal o f a person from office, cite for 
contempt, or impose any other civil penalty. A civil 
penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(3Xa) When a person is adjudged guilty o f 
criminal activity which has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution* up t o double the amount o f 
pecuniary damages to the victim or victims o f the 
offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, 
is convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court unless the court in applying the criteria in 
Subsection (b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
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ace. or inappropriate, the- court/ shall maker the 
reasons for the decision a part of its written order. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order res-
titution, or restitution which is complete, partial, or 
nominal, the court shall take into account: 
OX The financial resources o f the defendant 
and the burden that- payment of restitution will 
impose* with due regard to the other obligations of 
thedefendant; 
00 The ability of the defendant to pay resti-
tutio© on an installment basis or on other conditi-
ons to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant 
of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) Other circumstances which in the opinion 
of the court shall make restitution inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on such issue. 
(4) As used in subsection (3) above: 
(a) "Criminal activities* means any offense 
with respect to which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant 
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct; 
(b) 'Pecuniary damages* means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a person 
could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities and shall include* but 
not be limited to, the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses such as earnings and medical expenses; 
(c) 'Restitution* means full, partial, or 
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including insured damages; 
(d) 'Victim* means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages..as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities; 
"victim* shall not include any coparticipant in the 
defendant's criminal activities. 
(5) If a statute under which the defendant war 
convicted .mandates that one of three stated 
minimum terms must be imposed, the court shall 
order imposition of the term of middle severity 
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mi-
tigation of the crime. Prior to or at the time of se-
ntencing, either party may submit a statement iden-
tifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation , 
or to present additional facts. If the statement is in 
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served 
on the opposing party at least four days prior to the 
time set for sentencing* In. determining whether 
there are circumstances that justify imposition of 
the highest of lowest term, the court may consider 
the record in the case, the probation officer's 
report, other report*, including reports received: 
pursuant to section 76-3-404, and statements in 
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosec-
ution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(61 The court shall set forth on the record the 
facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper 
or lower term. 
(7) The court in* determining a just sentence shall 
be guided by sentencing rules regarding aggravation 
and mitigation promulgated by the Utah Judicial 
Council. 
(a> If a defendant subject to this section hat been 
sentenced and committed to the Utah state prison , 
the court may, within 12Q days of the date of com* 
mitment on its own morion, or at any time upon 
the recommendation of the board of pardons, recall 
the sentence and commitment previously ordered 
and resentence the defendant in the same manner as 
if he had not previously been sentenced, so long at 
the new sentence is no greater than the initial 
sentence. The resentencing provided for in this 
section shall comply with the sentencing rules of the 
Utah Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity of 
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
Credit shall be given for time served. 
(9) The court shall state the reasons for its 
sentence choice on the record at the time of senten-
cing. The court shall also inform the defendant as 
part of the sentence that if the defendant is released 
from prison, he or she may nonetheless be on 
parole for a period of ten years. 
(10) If during the commission of a crime 
described as child kidnaping, rape of a child, object 
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual 
abuse of a child, the actor causes substantial bodily 
injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in 
the information or indictment and admitted by the 
actor, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the 
actor shall, notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term 
in state prison. i*4 
76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution as 
contempt • Imprisonment • Relief where defsuit not 
contempt - Collection of default, 
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or 
to make* restitution defaults in the payment thereof 
or of any installment, the court on motion of the 
county attorney, victim, or upon its own motion 
may require him to show cavise why his default 
should not be treated as contempt of court, and 
may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of 
arrest for his appearance. 
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default 
was not attributable to an intentional refusal to 
obey the order of the court or to a failure on his 
part to make a good faith effort to make the 
payment* the court may find tliat his default coast* 
itutes contempt and may order him committed until 
the fine or the restitution, or a specified part 
thereof, is paid. 
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is 
imposed on a corporation or unincorporated assoc-
iation, it is the duty of the person authorized to 
make disbursement from the assets of the corporat-
ion or association to pay the fine or make the resti-
tution from those assets* and his failure to do so 
may be held to be contempt unless he makes the 
showing required in subsection (2) of this section. 
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for 
nonpayment of fines or failure to make restitution 
shall be set forth in the commitment order. 
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction'of the court 
that the default in the payment of a fine or restitu-
tion is not contempt, the court may enter an order 
allowing the defendant additional time for payment, 
reducing the amount thereof or of each installment 
or revoking the fine or order of restitution or the 
unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part. 
A default in the payment of a fine or costs or 
failure to make restitution or any installment 
thereof may be collected by any means authorized 
by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The 
county attorney may collect restitution in behalf of 
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(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction 
of any crime- or offense,, except in. the case of class* 
C misdemeanors, for which supervised probation by 
the Department of Corrections may not be imposed, 
and if it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation 
for a period of time it may determine, unless-
otherwise provided by law. The legal custody of all 
probationers referred to the Department of Correc-
tions is vested in the court having jurisdiction and 
the Department of Corrections. The legal custody of 
all unsupervised probationers is vested in the court 
having jurisdiction of the offender. 
(2X&) The Department of Corrections shall 
establish presentence investigation and supervision 
standard* for all individuals under its jurisdiction: 
These standards shall be based on the type of 
offense and other criteria, including the demand for 
services and the available agency resources, which 
the Department of Corrections deems appropriate td 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed' supervision and investigation 
standards- shall be submitted to the State Judicial 
Council and Board of Pardons for review and 
comment prior to adoption by the Department o£ 
Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the 
Department of Corrections is not required to 
supervise the probation or parole of any person 
convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, 
at the discretion of the Department of Corrections, 
and based upon adopted standards, accept a person 
for supervision who is convicted of a class B misd-
emeanor. 
(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an 
offense for which probation may: be granted* the 
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of 
obtaining a pre-sentence report or information from 
other sources on the defendant. The report shall be 
prepared by the adult probation and parole section 
of the Department of Corrections. The report shall 
include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, 
accompanied by a recommendation from Adult 
Probation and Parole regarding the payment of re-
stitution by the defendant. The contents of. the 
report shall be confidential* The court may disclose 
all or parts, of the report to the defendant or his 
counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the 
time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting 
attorney may wish to present concerning the appro-
priate sentence. This testimony ot inf ormation* shall 
be presented in open court on record and in the 
presence of the defendant. 
(5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a 
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former 
conviction or acquittal or once-in jeopardy, if the 
judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the 
judgment in accordance witlt Ru&'ZZ, utan Kuiet 
of Criminal Procedure.: When* possible^ in" aH 
offenses, involving; damage to persons- or- property, 
the pre-sentence report of the defendant shall' be 
made available to- the court prior to the pronounce* 
ment of judgment. 
(6) After a hearing, the court may increase or 
decrease the probation period; unless otherwise 
provided, by law, and may revoke or modify any 
condition of probation. While on probation, and as 
a condition- of probation, the defendant may be 
required to: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine 
imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under provisions of 
Section 77«32a-l through 77-32a-14; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose 
support he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available * rehabilitation 
programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not 
to exceed one year; OF 
(f) serve a term of home confinement. The 
court may impose all or part of the cost* of super-
vision as a condition of home confinement. 
(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a 
hearing in court a finding is made that restitution is 
inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201 (3Xb) or 
the defendant objects to its imposition under Subs-
ection 76-3-201 (3Xc). 
(&7 While on probation and as a condition of 
probation, the defendant shall be required to make 
restitution or reparation to the victim or victims as 
defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) for pecuniary 
damages, as provided in Section- 76-3-201 caused by 
the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was, 
had or by any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court, unless the 
court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76*-
3-201(3) finch that restitution is inappropriate. If 
the court determines that restitution is inappropria-
te, the court shall state for the court record the 
reasons for the decision. 
(9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the re-
stitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk 
shall place the order on the civil docket and shall 
provide notice of the order to the parties. The orde* 
shall be treated as a legal judgment under which the 
victim may seek civil remedy. 
(10Xa) Upon completion-without violation of IS 
months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases, 
the offender shall be terminated from sentence, 
unless the person is earlier terminated by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify 
the- sentencing court in writing 30 days in advance 
in all cases where termination of supervision will 
occur by law. The notification shall include a 
probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of 
probation the court may, after a hearing with 
proper notice, upon its own motion or the motion 
of the prosecutor, extend probation for good cause 
shown, for one additional term of 18 months in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases or six months 
in class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons for the 
extension of the probation* period shall be made a 
part of the court record. 
(d) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convic-
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j ^ order that, the term of probation for the 
original crime or offense commence again for the 
full term-
(ilXa> All time served on probation by any 
pffsoa without violation applies to service of the 
jptai. term- of probation but does not preclude the 
requirement of serving 18 months without violation 
[0 felony* or class A misdemeanor cases, or six 
months in dasa-B misdemeanor cases. Any time 
speot by a person outside of confinement after 
^insnission of a probation violation does not cons-
titute service of the total term unless the person is 
^aerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
A0y time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing 
or decision concerning revocation of probation does 
aot constitute service of the term of probation 
except in the case of exoneration at the hearing, in 
wbich case the time spent shall be included in 
computing the total probation term. 
(b) Whenever any probationer, without j 
authority from the court or the Department of Co- j 
rrcctkras* absents himself from the state, or avoids 
or evades probation supervision, the period of 
absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation 
period. j 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court 
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the 
discretion of the court. 
(12X*) Probation- may not be revoked except 
upon * hearing in court and a finding that the con-
ditionsof probation have been violated* 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of 
the conditions of probation, the court which autho-
rised probation shall determine whether the 
affidavit establishes probable cause-to believe that 
revocation or modification of probation may be ju-
stified.. If the court determines that there is 
probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked or modified. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time 
and place for the hearing, which shall be within 
seven days of the service upon the defendant unless 
he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall 
inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. The order shall 
also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the 
defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the 
allegations, which need not be evidence admissible 
in a trial. The persons who have given adverse inf-
ormation on which the allegation* are based shall* be 
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the 
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear 
and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings 
of fact. Upon determining that the defendant 
violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, or continu-
ed. If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall 
be executed. 
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ur felony and ciasr A misdemeanor cases or a sir-
month term in class B misdemeanor cases has been 
completed without violation, but fine or restitution 
orders are still outstanding, supervision by the Dep-
artment of Corrections shall be terminated pursuant 
to this section. In cfaua B misdemeanors where 
probation supervision is not provided, the court 
may order the Department of Corrections to 
monitor the payment of any fine or restitution 
ordered and give the court notice of the completion 
of payment or the failure of the defendant to make 
payment as ordered. The court may retain jurisdict-
ion for the purposes of collecting he tines or restit-
ution. In these cases, the court may order the Dep-
artment of Social Services to enforce the collection, 
and the Office of Recovery Services may withhold 
the cost of collection from any recovered fine or 
restitution. 
(14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is 
considered a debt for 'willful and malicious injury* 
for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in 
bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, 
U.S.OA. i w 
77-18-2. Expattgement and seating of records. 
(lXa) Any ]>erson who has been conykted of any 
crime within this state may petition the convicting 
court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his 
record in that court. At the time the petition is filled 
and served upon the prosecuting attorney, the court 
shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosec* 
uting attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for 
hearing. Any person who may have relevant infor-
mation about the petitioner may testify at the 
hearing; and the court, in its discretion, may request 
a written evaluation of the adult parole and 
probation section of the state Department of Corr-
ections. 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period 
of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanot 
or felony, or for a period of three years in the case 
of other misdemeanors or infractions, after his 
release from incarceration, parole, or probation 
whichever occurs last, has not been convicted of a 
felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude and that no proceeding involving such a 
crime is pending or being instituted against the pet-
itioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of 
petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of 
the court, it shall enter an order that all records in 
petitioner's case in the custody of that court ot in 
the custody of any other court, agency or official be 
sealed. The provisions of this subsection shall not 
apply to violations for the operation of motor 
vehicle under Title 41. The court shall also issue to 
the petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding 
that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation. 
(2X&) In any case in which a person has been 
arrested with or without a warrant, that individual 
after 12 months, provided there have been no inter-
vening arrests, may petition trie court in which the 
proceeding occurred, orr if there were no court pr-
oceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the 
arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all 
records of arrest and detention which may have 
been made, if any of the following occurred: 
(i) He was released without the riling of 
formal charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, 
he was discharged without a conviction and no 
charges were refiled against him within 30 days the-
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^k> Upon rerinttt for ddfrerationv the jury may 
take wittthenrtte "Mictions of the court and all 
exhibits tad paP*" w«»ch have been received at 
evidence, exce* depositions; and each juror may 
also take with &* *W notes of the testimony or 
other proceed ^ t a by himself, but none taken 
by any other p*5011- . . 
0) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, 
theyibsil be kept together in some convenient place 
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are o^schtrged, unless otherwise ordered 
by lit court- Except by order of the court, the 
officer havtfl them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them, or make 
any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed 
upon their verdict, ind he shall not, before the 
verdict iJ rendered, communicate to any person the 
smc of their deliberations or the verdict agreed 
upon, (m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if 
tbey desire to be informed on any point of law 
ansing in the cause, they shall inform the officer in 
charge of them, who shall communicate such 
request to the court The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where, in the 
presence of the defendant and both counsel, the 
court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury 
that no further iiistrucrions shall be given. Such 
response shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the incntiry in writing without 
having the jury brought before the court, in which 
case die inquiry and response thereto shall be 
entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect 
on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under 
the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(0) At the coN^usion of the evidence by the pro-
secution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence, 
the court may issue an order dismissing any infor* 
mation or indictment, or any count thereof, upon 
the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient 
to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense. im 
7745-18. Rile If - Stitcttan of Jwy. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause phis 
such an additional number at will allow for all per-
emptory challenges permitted. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, 
and any such new juror may be challenged for 
cause. When the challenges for cause are compkteeV 
the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remauiing, 
and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one 
juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may 
direct, until ail peremptory challenges are exhausted 
or waived. The d o t shall then call the remaining 
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to* 
constitute the jury, in the order in which they 
appear on the list, and the persons whose names are 
so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the prosp-
ective jurors or may itself conduct the exaniination* 
In the latter event, the court may permit counsel ot 
the defendant to supplement the examination by 
such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may 
itself submit to the prospective jurors additional 
CODE«CO 
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-jobbing and shelter, if placed on probation;. j 
(cVThe defendant lacks the ability to engage in 
rational decision-making process regarding the 
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by 
gyidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and 
benefits of treatment; 
(dV There is no appropriate treatment alternat-
ive to a court order of hospitalization; and 
(c}> The Utah state hospital or other suitable I 
facility can provide the defendant with treatment,. 
e9tc9 and custody that is adequate and appropriate 
to the defendant's conditions and needs. 
(5) When the defendant is not already under an 
ofder of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, 
jjjc court shall order hospitalization, if appropriate, 1 
for * period not to exceed six months without 
benefit of a review hearing. Hospitalization may be 
ordered at the Utah state hospital or other suitable 
facility as the, court deems appropriate. Upon such 
f review hearing, to be commenced prior to the ex-
piration of the previous order, an order for hospiti-
lj2ation may be made for an indeterminate period if 
fac court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
tint the required conditions of subsection (4) of this 
section will last for an indeterminate period. 
(6) A defendant committed to the Utah state 
Hospital or other suitable facility for an indetermin-
itc period shall be entitled to petition the sentencing 
(oort for a rehearing at six month intervals, and the 
confinement facility shall submit a report to the 
sentencing court at twelve month invervals. 
(7) The period of commitment to the Utah state 
hospital or other suitable facility, as provided for in 
^ section, shall in no circumstance be longer than 
the maximum sentence imposed' 6y tne court. f 
(8) When the Utah state hospital or other suitable 
facility proposes to discharge a defendant prior to 
the expiration of sentence, the institution shall 
transmit to the board of pardons a report on the 
condition of the defendant which includes the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment, 
and the prognosis for the remission of symptoms, 
the potential for recidivism and for the danger to 
himself or the public, and recommendations for 
future treatment. The board of pardons shall direct 
that the defendant serve any or all of the unexpired 
term of the sentence at the Utah state prison, or 
place the defendant on parole. In the event that the I 
board of pardons, pursuant to law or administrative t 
rales, should consider for parole any defendant who 
his been adjudged guilty and mentally ill, the board 1 
shall consult with the treating facility or agency and 
in additional report on the condition of the 
defendant may be filed with the board* Pending I 
action of the board, the defendant shall remain at 
the institution at which he is hospitalized. If the 
defendant is placed on parole, treatment shall, upon 
the recommendation of the hospital facility, be 
made a condition of parole, and failure to continue 
treatment or other condition of parole except by 
qnsement with the designated fadhtyaad the board f 
of pardons shall be basis for initiating parole 
violation hearings. The period of parole shall not be 
for less than five yean or until the expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and 
thill not be reduced without consideration by the 
board of pardons of a current report on the mental 
health status of the offender. 
(9) If a defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
md mentally ill is placed on probation under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, the trial judge 
*aH make treatment a condition of probation if the 
defendant is snown to oe ircataui© «uu iaumm 
exist for treatment of the offender in a probation 
status. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall 
be filed with the probation officer and the sentenc-
ing court. Failure to continue treatment or other 
condition of probation, except by agreement with 
the treating agency and the sentencing court, shall 
be a basis for the initiation of probation violation 
bearings. The period of probation shall not be for 
less than five years or until the expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, whichever comet first, and 
shall not be reduced by the sentencing court without 
consideration of a current report on* the mental 
health status of the offender. Treatment or other 
care may be provided by an agency of the division 
of mental health, or with the approval of the sente-
ncing court, or by any other mental health provider. 
A report shall be filed with the probation officer 
and the sentencing court every three months during 
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition 
to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, 
the probation officer shall request a report. A 
motion on a petition to discontinue probation shall 
not be heard more than once every six months. 1*3 
77-35-22* Rule 22 - Sentence, judgment! and com-
mitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty 
or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defen-
dant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter 
bai) or recognizance,, 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford 
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement 
in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal 
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be gives an opport-
unity to present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds: that a defendant may be 
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in 
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by 
the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilt/ or plea of no 
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall 
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall 
advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed, 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the 
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the 
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the com-
mitment to the jail or prison and shall make his 
return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
iff* 
77-35-23. Role 23 - Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, 
the court upon its own initiative may, or upon 
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public 
offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a 
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entered or jeopardy has attached*, order a commit-
ment until the defendant ischargetTaneW or retried, 
or may enter any other order as may be just and 
proper under the circumstances. i*t* 
77-35-24. Rale 24 - Motkw for new trial. 
. (a}. The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its- own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or impropri- | 
et> which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a pasty. 
(bt A. motion for a new trial shall, be made in 
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be acco* 
mpanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential 
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is 
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court 
may postpone the hearing on the motion for such 
time as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
10 days' after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted; the party shall be hi 
the same position as if no trial had been held and 
the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned I 
either in evidence or in argument. ittt 
77-35-23. R*k 25 - I M i i t f I wUhort trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its 
own initiative or upon application of either party, 
order an information or indictment dismissed* 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or 
indictment when: 
{\) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional \ 
delay in bringing defendant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the informationr or indie* 
tment, together with any bill of particulars [ 
furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the 
offense intended to be charged in the pleading so 
filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and 
prejudicial defect in the impanelling or in the1 proc-
eedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or ~ 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of l 
limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set 
forth in an order and entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds 
that there was unreasonable delay, or the court is | 
without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly 
alleged in the information or indictment, or there I 
was a defect in the impanelling or of the proceeds I 
ngs relating to the grand jury, further prosecution | 
for the offense shall not be barred and the court I 
may make such orders with respect to the custody 
of the defendant pending the filing of new charges 
as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the 
defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated. I 
An otder of dismissal based upon unconstitutlo- I 
nal delay in bringing the defendant to trial or based 
upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any 
other prosecution for the offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the 
prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case if it is 
compromised by the defendant and the injured 
party. The injured party shall first acknowledge the 
compromise before the court or in writing* The 
reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and 
entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to 
another prosecution for the same offense; provided 
however, that dismissal b^corapronifs^ sfttUPnofW 
granted when the misdemeanor is committeo^By^l 
upon a peace officer while in th& performance ^ 
his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to comnjft 
a felony. 
77-35-26. Rule 26 - Appeals. 
(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk ^ 
the court from which the appeal is taken, a notice Q2 
appeal stating the order or judgment appealed fro^ 
and by serving a copy: thereof upon the advent 
party or his attorney of record. Proof of service ^ 
such copy shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) From the final judgment of convictions. 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant; 
(3) From an interlocutory order whenr upo* 
petition for review, the supreme court decides thai-
such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; 
or 
(4) From any order of the court judging the 
defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect^  
incompetent to proceed further in a pending prostN 
cution. 
(c) Ah appeal may be taken by the prosecutions 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution 
because of a finding of double jeopardy or deniw-
of a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court holding * 
statute or any part thereof invalid; or 
(5) From an order of the court granting, a pre. 
trial motion to suppress evidence when, upon*g 
petition for review, the supreme court decides that 
such an appeal would be in the interest of justice. 
(dXl) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken 
within 30 days after the entry of the judgment 
appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after 
notice of the denial of the motion is given to the 
defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving sudr 
notice shall be filed with the court, 
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for * 
material defect in the taking thereof, or for failure 
to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms* the 
judgment unless another appeal can be, and is, 
timely taken. 
(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant ir 
unable to post bond shall be given a preferred and 
expeditious: setting in the appellate court. 
(0 Appeals'may be submitted on briefs and if an 
appellant's brief is filed the appeal shall be decided 
even though a party, upon due notice of the 
hearing, shall fail to appear for oral argument. 
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appealr 
shall govern criminal appeals to the supreme court 
except as otherwise provided. 
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death 
has been imposed, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing .court of. the entire 
record unless the time is extended by the supreme 
court for good cause. A case involving the sentence 
of death shall have priority over all other cases*, in 
setting for hearing and in disposition,, by the 
supreme court. 
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit 
courts promulgated by the judicial council; and 
approved by the supreme court relating to appeals 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN SHEPHERD DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 8354 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
Attached hereto are jury instructions, number 1 to number 
2.S » inclusive, as given by the Court in this case. 
Dated this ^0 day of October, 1982. 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
Carole B. MelTor, Clerk for hearing 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
Plaintiff 
THE STATE OF UTAH,
 x „.„„«« wim**** 
MINUTE ENTKT 
CASE NUMBER 8354 
DATED November 26, 1982 
JOHN SHEPHARD DAVIS, 
Defendant 1 DON V. TIBBS JUDGE 
Noall T. Wootton-Steve Kill pack, for State 
Ronald Stanger, for Defendant 
This matter comes before the Court at this time for Sentencing. A Motion for 
a New Trial and Motion for Arrested Judgment has been filed by the Defendant. 
Mr. Ronald Stanger addressed the Court and stated in his arguments on the 
Motion that the State's case was improperly charged. Upon hearing arguments 
in this matter the Motion for New Trial and Arrested Judgment is Denied. Court 
feels matters brought out in the Motion were in harmless error (regarding 
points set forth in Motion—1 thru 6. It is an improper basis to set aside 
Judgment. 
At this time the State of Utah will be heard regarding recommendations for 
Defendant Davis. Mr. Wootton made his recommendations, followed by Deputy 
Steve Killpack. Mr. Wootton-in his recommendations stated his office took 
the position that the statutory sentence should be carried, out, i.e., Six 
months time in the County Jail and probation after that period of time. He 
stated that attorneys have a great duty to the general public and if they are 
derelict in their duties it casts a shadow on the entire legal profession. 
He stated any fine should go toward restitution and he could work that out in 
public service. Mr. Killpack, in his statements, addressed his remarks towards 
a particular letter sent to the Court by one of the services in Utah County. 
Mr. Killpack had same recommendations for sentencing as did the County Attorney. 
Mr. Dean Hansen A. P. and P. officer, stated in his conversation with some of 
the jurors-some of them felt they were not sure they had made the right decision 
in finding the Defendant guilty 
Defense Attorney Stanger then addressed the Court regarding recommendations. He 
stated the case had been very traumatic for him as a lawyer. He said that 
any restitution in the case should be as set forth in the civil action now pending, 
Sentencing should be in public service and not in jail or prison time. 
nappy witn nis services ana aner client naa oeen enricned trom his services 
then he filed his action against him—-the defendant. 
Mr. Wootton then re-addressed the Court, mentioning othersimilar cases. 
Court at this time stated his sorry to the Defendant and his family and that 
the recommendations and letters to the Court regarding Mr. Davis had been the 
most supportive and the best recommendations he had ever received on any action. 
Defendant sentenced this time as follows: Term in the Utah State Prison not 
to exceed five years, fined $5,000.00. Fine and prison sentence stayed and the 
Defendant is placed on probation for 2 years. Defendant is to work for the 
Utah County Sanity Administration one day a week for 50 weeks, with no charge 
to Utah County or to the State of Utah. Restitution shall be as determined in 
the Civil law suit re: Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. Defendant is on 
stiff probation for two years and is not to use liquor, drugs, or make any 
violation of the law during that period. Crime charged "theft by deception" 
is reduced to a Third Degree Felony", Work arrangements shall be arranged throag< 
the Sanity Administration! by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office. il 
Court is in recess. 1 C 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
Room 107, County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
373-5510 Ext. 320 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : STIPULATION AND ORDER 
vs. : 
Case No. 8354 
JOHN S. DAVIS, : 
Defendant. : 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant hereby stipulate that the 
Defendant's probation may be extended to April 1, 19 85, in order 
to allow Defendant additional time to file motions and to comply 
with the Court's prior order of probation. 
2. The Defendant has represented that he intends to move 
for a new trial by written motion in the near future. Additional 
time will be required for the State to respond to such motion. 
3. The Department of Adult Probation and Parole have 
recommended that the Court further consider the assessment of 
restitution as a condition of the Defendant's probation at a 
hearing where the victims are represented. Mr. Joe Tesch, attorney 
for said victims will be unavailable to appear at such hearing until 
after November 15, 1984. 
4. Defendant waives his right to be present at a hearing 
extending his probation to April 1, 19 85, and stipulates that the 
Court may proceed in his absence to set a date and time for further 
review of his probation at any time convenient to the Court's 
schedule in Manti between December 1, 19 84, and April 1, 19 85. 
DATED this 2& day of ^fetft^fe^W '^^Am 
_^__^ _^£^_ 
Jpttn Dav i s , Defendant 
Steven B. Ki! 
Deputy County Attorney 
O R D E R 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court by 
Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, and the 
Court having consulted with the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes and 
enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's probation is extended to April 1, 19 85. 
2. Any motions Defendant intends to have considered by the 
Court at the next scheduled hearing to be set between December 1, 
19 84, and April 1, 19 85, in Manti, shall be filed in writing on 
-2-
or before November 10, 19 84, and the State is ordered to respond 
within ten working days of their receipt of such motions. 
3. The Department of Adult Probation and Parole is ordered 
to contact the clerk of the Court in Manti and set a date and 
time for a hearing to review the status of the Defendant's probation 
between December 1, 1984 and April 1, 1985, and to notify the 
parties of such hearing date, and to request that Mr. Joe Tesch, 
attorney for the victims in this case, also appear at such hearing 
to advise the Court regarding the status of the civil proceedings. 
DATED this /3 day of AJo4f>M ^< , 1984. 
J v H*~ 
Don V. Tibbs, Judge 
Approved as to Form 
O 
Richard Lindsay 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C 
00OO00 
Regular May Term, 1984 June 25, 1984 
State of Utah, REMITTITUR 
Plaintiff and Respondent, No. 18892 
District No. 8354 
v. 
John Shepard Davis. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, 
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court 
herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Regular May Term, 1984 October 2, 1984 
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing 
heretofore filed herein, and the arguments of counsel thereupon had, 
it is ordered that the rehearing be, and the same is, denied. 
Issued: November 21, 1984 
Record: 3 Volumes 
1 Envelope 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 18892 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v» June 25, 1984 
John Shepard Davis, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This-is an appeal from a third degree felony convic-
tion of theft. Defendant assigns the following as error: 
(1)' insufficiency of the evidence; (2) denial of his motion to 
waive a jury trial; (3) admission of improper evidence during 
the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) inclusion of a partial 
written deposition in the evidence which the jury was permitted 
to take with them into their place of deliberation. 
In 1978, Joseph Mascaro and Charley Joseph became 
investment partners, for the purpose of purchasing options on two 
adjacent parcels of real property located in Utah County. While 
holding said options, Mascaro and Joseph (hereinafter the 
"partnership") initiated a sale of both parcels to Paul Tanner, 
who intended to develop the lots into a subdivision. Prior to 
the consummation of that sale, however, the term of the options 
expired and Tanner was able to negotiate a direct purchase on 
the larger of the two parcels (consisting of approximately 130 
acres) from Stan Logan, the former owner thereof. The partner-
ship was able to renew its option on the smaller 18-acre parcel, 
which it then exercised by purchasing the said parcel on uniform 
real estate contract for $117,000. Inasmuch as this smaller 
parcel provided access to the larger parcel purchased by Tanner, 
it was essential to Tanner's proposed development. Tanner 
therefore purchased the smaller parcel from the partnership on 
uniform real estate contract at a price of $165,000. He paid 
$40,000 down on the contract, but was unable thereafter to 
obtain the necessary financing to pay off the $125,000 balance. 
In December of 1978, defendant John Davis, an attor-
ney, was hired by the partnership to collect the balance owing 
~. In violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. 
2. The $40,000 received from Tanner was disbursed by the 
partnership as follows: $33,000 was paid as a down payment on 
the partnership's contract to purchase the 18-acre parcel; 
$4,000 was paid to the real estate company handling the trans-
action; and the remaining $3,000 was split equally between 
Mascaro and Joseph. 
on the Tanner contract. During the initial meeting between 
defendant and the partnership, one of the matters discussed 
relative to the impending collection was that of attorney 
fees. Defendant indicated that his fee for the requested 
services would be between $9,000 and $12,000, depending upon the 
extent of the work involved. The partnership, however, coun-
tered with an offer of a flat fee of $20,000 to cover the 
collection as well as defendant's representation of the partner-
ship in any connected litigation. The record does not reveal 
which fee proposal was ultimately agreed upon. 
Defendant was successful in negotiating a settlement 
between the partnership and Tanner, whereby Tanner agreed to 
sell his interest in both parcels if the partnership could find 
another buyer before Tanner could obtain financing. This 
settlement agreement was reduced to writing and signed by the 
parties (i.e., Mascaro, Joseph and Tanner) on February 8, 1979. 
Soon thereafter, defendant was commissioned by the partnership 
to .effectuate the resale of the property. According to the 
testimony of Charley Joseph, defendant was to be paid an addi-
tional $20,000 if he was successful in finding a new buyer and 
completing the resale transaction. That testimony was however 
contradicted by defendant, who testified that he had agreed to 
perform the said services in exchange for one-third of the total 
income derived from the transaction. The record does not con-
tain any written documentation evidencing the parties' inten-
tions with respect to attorney fees. 
Less than a month and a half after the signing of the 
settlement agreement, defendant succeeded in negotiating a new 
sale of the subject property (both parcels) to Chatillion, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Chatillion") at a total price of $1,280,000. 
Since the said property consisted of two distinct parcels owned 
by different individuals (i.e., a 130-acre parcel owned by Stan 
Logan and an 18-acre parcel owned by the partnership), the sale 
was accomplished by executing a separate earnest money agree-
ment between Chatillion and each of the owners. The agreement 
relevant to these proceedings is that between Chatillion and 
the partnership concerning the 18-acre parcel. That agreement 
provided that Chatillion would pay the partnership approximately 
$141,000 in cash and transfer to it property valued at $240,000. 
A closing was held on June 5, 1979, at which time 
Curtis Baum, Chatillion's principal officer and stockholder, 
tendered to the partnership a check for $100,000, as well as 
the deeds to eight building lots. The check was made payable 
to defendant in his capacity as attorney for the partnership 
and was deposited by defendant in his trust account, as per the 
directions of Charley Joseph. The building, lots were rejected 
by the partnership because they were of insufficient value. As 
Tl The cash balance of $41,000 was to be paid within the 
following week. As will be shown infra, said payment was made 
in full, though perhaps not within the week after the closing. 
a result, Baum tendered deeds to another eight lots, but failed 
to deliver therewith an appraisal to substantiate their value. 
At trial Joseph testified that at the time the initial 
funds were received from Chatillion and deposited, he gave de-
fendant specific instructions regarding the disbursement there-
of. Those instructions were as follows: (1) Joseph was to 
receive, and did receive on that particular occasion, a check 
for $20,000 to cover his expenses; (2) $30,000 to $40,000 was 
to be applied toward the partnership's purchase of the 18-acre 
parcel from Shelby Taylor (original owner of the said parcel); 
(3) $25,000 to $30,000 was to be disbursed to Joseph Mascaro as 
his partnership share; and (4) an unspecified amount was to be 
reserved to cover closing expenses. 
Also testifying in regard to the disbursement instruc-
tions was Curtis Baum, who claimed to have been present at the 
time the $100,000 was deposited by defendant and to have been 
privy to the conversations between defendant and Joseph con-
cerning the appropriation of that money. His recollection of 
the instructions given defendant was identical to that given by 
Joseph (in his trial testimony), with only one exception: he 
thought he recalled the amount set aside for Mascaro as being 
$20,000 to $25,000, rather than $25,000 to $30,000. 
Another witness who claimed to have been privy to the 
subject conversation between defendant and Joseph was George 
Robinson, an employee of the defendant's on the occasion so 
specified. Robinson's testimony in this respect was consistent 
with Joseph's in nearly every respect, the only variation being 
that he did not recall a specific dollar amount committed to 
Shelby Taylor; rather, he thought the instruction with respect 
to the Taylor obligation was that an unspecified amount (of the 
deposited funds) should be used to make a down payment on an 
apartment complex that would then be conveyed to Taylor in 
satisfaction of the partnership's obligation to him. 
Defendant's version of the instructions given him as 
to the disbursement of the $100,000 was at variance with that 
adduced by the plaintiff through the testimonies of Joseph, 
Baum and Robinson, supra. He testified that Joseph's instruc-
tions were to apply the funds toward the retainer (i.e., al-
legedly a one-third contingency fee) and use them as needed at 
his (defendant's) own discretion. 
Bank records produced at trial revealed that on June 5, 
1979, prior to the recording of the $100,000 deposit, defen-
dant's trust account registered an overdraft of $14.23. On 
June 18, 1979, less than two weeks after the said deposit was 
made, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft of 
$435.67. During that two-week period, only $25,903.64 from 
defendant's trust account was expended in connection with his 
4. Appraisals were to be delivered within a few days. The 
record does not show whether said delivery took place. 
work for the partnership; the balance was spent on defendant's 
personal expenses. 
Over the period between June 25, 1979, and September 12, 
1979, defendant received and deposited in his trust account on 
behalf of the partnership additional payments from Chatillion 
totalling $41,037.09. Of this amount only $21,854 was expended 
in connection with business of the partnership. Thus, of the 
total $141,037.09 received from Chatillion and deposited into 
defendant's trust account, only $47,757.64 was spent in fur-
therance of ..partnership business, leaving a difference of 
$93,279.45. 
Despite Chatillion's satisfaction of the cash obli-
gation on the 18-acre purchase, the sale of that parcel was 
never fully consummated because an agreement was never reached 
in respect to the value of the lots tendered by Chatillion. 
5. ' The $25,903.64 figure was calculated on the basis of the 
following stipulated expenditures: (1) a $20,000 payment to 
Charley Joseph; (2) a $903.64 payment to Bitner Excavating in 
satisfaction of a debt owed by Joseph; and (3) a $5,000 payment 
to defendant's employee, George Robinson, for work done for the 
partnership. 
6. The parties further stipulated that defendant's personal 
expenditures from the $100,000 included, inter alia, the 
following: (1) payment of $1,753.27 to Jones Paint & Glass for 
installation of a window at defendant's residence; (2) payment 
of $26,644.23 to Thorn, Inc., for accounts previously collected 
on behalf of Thorn, Inc.; (3) payment of $6,920 to L. Flake 
Rogers for back rent on defendant's office; (4) payment of 
$4,183.20 to Deseret Federal Savings for payments in arrears on 
defendant's home; (5) payment of $3,119.70 to M. Dayle Jeffs, 
an attorney, in settlement of a 1977 default judgment against 
defendant for unpaid credit card debts; (6) payment of $9,125 
to F.M.A. Leasing for the lease of a 1974 vehicle and a 
Burroughs computer; (7) payment of $4,713.75 to Burroughs 
Corporation for updating the memory of defendant's computer; 
(8) payment of $6,530 to Provo 27th Ward as a charitable con-
tribution; (9) payment of $1,432.46 to Meredith & Day on a 
student loan debt; (10) payment of $2,392.72 to Service Station 
Supply, Inc., for accounts collected on its behalf; and (11) 
payment of $1,325.81 to Utah Office Supply for accounts 
collected on its behalf. 
7. It was stipulated that the $21,854 was spent as follows: 
(1) $18,000 was paid to Charley Joseph; (2) $2,500 was paid to 
George Robinson for work he performed for the partnership; 
(3) $1,000 was paid to Mountainland Realty; (4) $350 was paid 
to Aspen Engineering; and (5) $4 was paid to the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. 
8. The State acknowledged defendant's possible entitlement to 
a $20,000 fee pursuant to the flat fee arrangement described at 
trial by Joseph and, therefore, charged defendant with the 
theft of only $73,279.45 rather than the full $93,279.45. 
Also contributing to the failure to bring the sale to comple-
tion was the dispute that arose between the partners, Mascaro 
and Joseph, in November, 1979. The apparent cause of that dis-
pute was that Mascaro had never received his share of the money 
paid by Chatillion. As a result, Mascaro, along with Shelby 
Taylor, who likewise had never received a payment out of the 
said funds, obtained other counsel and in May of 1980 brought 
suit to recover the sums allegedly owed them, naming as de-
fendants Charley Joseph, Chatillion, Inc. (Baum), and the defen-
dant herein, John Davis. Defendant represented himself and 
Joseph in that action. However, he did not file an answer to 
the complaint, and consequently a default judgment was entered 
against them. He then succeeded in getting the judgment set 
aside and _was ordered to respond to the complaint within thirty 
days. Again, he failed to respond, and a second default judg-
ment was entered. The trial court subsequently ordered defen-
dant to withdraw as counsel because he was to be called as a 
witness by the plaintiffs (Mascaro and Brown). 
On June 18, 1981, after the second default judgment 
had been entered against Davis (defendant) and Charley Joseph, 
Joseph Rust, attorney for plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro, deposed 
defendant in connection with the continuing litigation between 
Rust's clients and Chatillion. At that deposition, defendant 
represented that he was still holding the monies received from 
Chatillion in his trust account, but refused to reveal the 
location of the trust account. After the deposition, Charley 
Joseph, who had been present and had heard defendant make the 
foregoing representation, inquired of defendant as to where he 
was holding the money. Defendant purportedly replied that he 
had the money but did not have to tell anyone where it was. 
Joseph subsequently filed a cross-claim against 
defendant and, at the suggestion of counsel, also filed criminal 
charges against him for theft. Defendant declined to answer the 
cross-claim because, as he later explained at trial, he did not 
want to prejudice his case in the present criminal matter. Con-
sequently, Joseph obtained a default judgment against defendant 
in the amount of $180,000. 
Attorney Rust petitioned the trial court for an order 
to require defendant to disclose information concerning his 
trust account. Several hearings were held on this matter, and 
finally an order was issued that defendant make full disclosure. 
As a result, defendant's bank records were obtained and it was 
discovered, contrary to what defendant had represented, that 
the funds received from Chatillion had been fully exhausted. 
As heretofore indicated, the records also revealed that the 
funds had been spent primarily in satisfaction of defendant's 
personal expenses. 
W~. That defendant made this representation was verified at 
trial by Joseph Rust, Charley Joseph and Brad Young (the court 
reporter who transcribed the deposition), all of whom were 
present at the June 18, 1981 deposition of defendant. 
-fw 
The instant matter proceeded to trial on October 18, 
1982. Defendant had made a motion before trial to waive his 
right to a jury trial, but his motion had been denied on the 
basis of a prosecution objection. The case was therefore tried 
before a jury, and defendant was found guilty of theft. 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant contends that the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to support his conviction of theft. 
Under familiar rules of appellate review, we are constrained to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict and will only interfere with or overturn the verdict 
when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reason-
able man could noi^possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
To sustain a conviction of theft, the evidence must 
establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(1) that the defendant obtained or exercised unlawful control 
over the-nroperty of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof. 
The underlying premise to defendant's claim of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence is the belief that his testimony pro-
vided the only reasonable and truthful account of the events 
and circumstances precipitating this action and therefore all 
conflicting evidence should have been disbelieved and dis-
regarded by the jury. Overlooked in this premise is the funda-
mental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of 
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury. In 
State v. Shonka, where the appellant made a claim similar to 
that made herein by defendant, this Court observed: 
10. Defendant was sentenced to not more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000. Both the sentence and 
fine were stayed, however, and defendant was placed on two 
years1 probation on condition that he work one day a week for 
fifty weeks for the Utah County Sanity Administration and that 
he make restitution to the victims in the amount determined by 
the civil lawsuit on the same matter. Defendant's conviction, 
although originally a second degree felony, was reduced at 
sentencing to a third degree felony. 
11. See State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 (1982); State v. 
Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982); State v. Asay, Utah, 631 
P.2d 861 (1981). 
12. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. It is noted that in order for 
a theft conviction to be punishable as a second degree felony 
(as this one was), the requirements of § 76-6-412 must also be 
satisfied. The latter section was satisfied in this case by 
the parties1 stipulation that the value of the property alleged 
to have been stolen exceeded $1,000. 
13. 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955). 
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What the defense argument overlooks is that 
the jury was not absolutely bound to be-
lieve all of the testimony of the defendant. 
It was their prerogative to give it only 
such weight as they thought it entitled to 
considered in the light of all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the occur-
rence, including the self-interest of the 
witness. 
To establish the first element of the offense, plain-
tiff had to show (1) that the money received from Chatillion 
actually belonged to the partnership, and (2) that defendant 
obtained or exercised unlawful control over that money. 
As proof that the money belonged to the partnership, 
plaintiff offered the following evidence: Curtis Baum's testi-
mony indicating his intention to pay the partnership with the 
money tendered to defendant and his perception of defendant's 
role with respect to the money as that of a mere conduit or 
intermediary; the check for $100,000 evidencing defendant's 
representative capacity by the fact that it was made payable to 
defendant not in a personal capacity, but rather as attorney 
for the partnership; and the testimony of both Joseph and the 
defendant to the effect that the money was deposited in 
defendant's account at Joseph's direction. 
To prove the second half of this element (i.e., the 
exercise of unlawful control), plaintiff established first, 
through the testimony of Charley Joseph, Curtis Baum and George 
Robinson, that defendant received explicit instructions from 
Joseph to disburse the money received from Chatillion in the 
payment of partnership expenses. Plaintiff then showed that of 
the $141,037.09 ultimately received from Chatillion, only 
$47,754.64 was disbursed as directed (i.e., on behalf of part-
nership expenses), while $93,279.45 was disbursed to satisfy 
defendant's personal obligations. Furthermore, plaintiff 
pointed out that while $20,000 of the $93,279.45 consumed by 
defendant was actually owed defendant by the partnership in 
attorney fees, defendant had only received authorization to 
take $6,000 toward his fee from the total received from 
Chatillion. As to the additional $20,000 offered defendant for 
arranging and transacting a new sale after the Tanner default, 
plaintiff pointed out that the sale had never been fully con-
summated and therefore the fee was not owing. 
The only evidence offered by defendant to controvert 
plaintiff's proof on this first element of the offense was his 
own testimony relative to the agreement for attorney fees 
and the instructions for the disbursement of the money received 
from Chatillion. As heretofore indicated, defendant testified 
that he was to receive a one-third contingency fee for his 
14. Id. at 714. 
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services subsequent to the Tanner default. Inasmuch as the 
sale to Chatillion was worth approximately $381,000 to the 
partnership, defendant claimed that his portion was in excess 
of $100,000. He further claimed that the partners had agreed 
to take as their portion the real property traded by Chatillion 
(valued at $240,000). Thus, he maintained that the $100,000 
received from Chatillion actually belonged to him. 
Even had the jury accepted defendant's representation 
as to the fee arrangement, they would not have been justified 
in concluding that his appropriation of the money received from 
Chatillion as his fee was proper because, as plaintiff pointed 
out, defendant never consummated the services for which he was 
to receive the alleged contingency fee. 
Defendant further testified that the instructions he 
received from Joseph relative to the disbursement of the money 
were that it should be applied toward defendant's retainer and 
used at his own discretion. Based on those instructions, he 
claimed that his expenditures were justified and did not con-
stitute an exercise of unauthorized control. 
Viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favor-
able to the jury's verdict, we believe reasonable minds could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash paid by 
Chatillion belonged to the partnership and that defendant's 
disbursement of that cash to himself for his own purposes con-
stituted unauthorized control. 
As to the second element of the offense, to wit: 
intent to deprive, it is well-settled that such need not be 
proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the defen-
dant's acts, conduct, statements or from the circumstances. 
According to plaintiff, the most salient evidence in this regard 
is as follows: Defendant twice failed to enter responsive 
pleadings in the civil action brought against himself, Joseph 
and Chatillion by Taylor and Mascaro, apparently to avoid being 
compelled to give an accounting of the money deposited in his 
trust account. Furthermore, he subsequently represented under 
oath at the June 18, 1981 deposition that he was still holding 
the money in his trust account, although bank records estab-
lished that he had in fact expended the money nearly a full 
year earlier. Plaintiff contends that this evidence, combined 
with that set forth above relative to defendant's appropriation 
of the money, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's 
"intent to deprive." 
Again, defendant urges that his testimony at trial 
that he honestly believed he was entitled to the money as his 
fee was sufficient to negate plaintiff's evidence (above) 
respecting the element of intent. The jury, however, whose 
JdZ State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220 (1983); State v. 
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 594 (1980). 
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prerogative it is to weigh such evidence, did not countenance 
defendant's position, and neither do we. 
This is not the first time this Court has found 
"intent to deprive" under circumstances such as are existing 
here. In State v. Shonka, supra, this Court ruled that the 
evidence that defendant admitted taking the money, failed to 
record it or report it to her supervisors, failed to disburse 
it in the proper manner, and refused to permit an audit of her 
personal accounts was sufficient to support the jury's finding 
of intent to steal. By comparison, in the instant matter, 
defendant admittedly appropriated most of the money for his own 
use, failed to report such appropriation to the partnership, 
failed to follow the disbursement instructions given him by 
Joseph and avoided revealing the location of his trust account 
and the nature of the expenditures. We hold, as did the Court 
in Shonka, that the evidence so stated constitutes a sufficient 
factual foundation from which reasonable minds could infer that 
defendant took the money with the intent to deprive the 
partnership thereof. 
II. RIGHT TO WAIVE A JURY TRIAL 
Defendant's second assignment of error is in respect 
to the trial court's denial of his motion to waive a jury 
trial. He claims that the court's ruling in this regard abro-
gated his constitutional right to an impartial trial. We do 
not agree. 
We addressed theginstant issue most recently in the 
case of State v. Studham. We determined therein that the 
trial court had not erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
waive his jury right. The rationale applied in reaching that 
determination is dispositive here: 
Although an accused is guaranteed a right 
of trial by jury, neither the state nor the 
federal constitution guarantees him a right 
to "waive" a jury trial. On the contrary, 
Federal Rule 23(a), Criminal Procedure, and 
its-counterpart, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-
17, both allow such waiver only by the 
16. Supra note 13, at 714. 
17. Pursuant to the guarantees set forth in Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, to wit: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right . . . to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed . . . . 
18. Utah, 655 P.2d 669 (1982). 
19. This section provides, in pertinent part: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by 
jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution. 
court's approval and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
In the instant case, neither the court nor the prose-
cution consented to the proposed waiver. Furthermore, the 
record is devoid of any indication that defendant was denied a 
fair trial as a result of the case being tried to a jury. We 
therefore hold that the trial court's denial of the requested 
waiver did not interfere with defendant's constitutional rights. 
III. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 
Defendant next assigns error in the admission of a 
written excerpt of his June 18, 1981 deposition as rebuttal 
evidence. The circumstances out of which this alleged error 
arose are set forth hereafter. 
During the presentation of its case-in-chief, plain-
tiff called upon Charley Joseph to testify concerning a response 
given by defendant at his June 18, 1981 deposition (to which 
Joseph had been privy) to the question as to whether defendant 
still had the money received from Chatillion in his trust 
account and, if so, where that account was located. Defendant's 
response to that question, as Joseph recalls it, was that the 
money was still in the account, but that he did not have to 
reveal the location of the account or anything further con-
cerning it. 
At that point in the trial proceedings, plaintiff 
moved to have the corresponding portion of the written deposi-
tion admitted into evidence as an exhibit. The trial court, 
however, expressed its view that such an admission would be 
duplicative in light of Joseph's testimony; whereupon, defendant 
made an objection to that effect which was sustained. 
During plaintiff's subsequent cross-examination of 
defendant, defendant was asked to verify his deposition state-
ment. His initial response was that he did not recall being 
asked the question or having answered it as Joseph had repre-
sented. After being shown the deposition to refresh his memory, 
he then claimed that he had misunderstood the question at the 
time it was asked (i.e., June 18, 1981) and that his answer had-
been clarified at a later deposition taken in September, 1981. 
20. Supra note 18, at 671. See also State v. Black, Utah, 
551 P.2d 518, 520 (1976); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 
(1965). 
21. The portion of the September 23, 1981 deposition that 
purportedly clarified the response in the earlier June deposi-
tion was read into the record as follows: 
Q. Am I to understand that you did not 
understand the question at that time? 
A. Well, apparently not. I have since 
answered as required by the Court. I 
answered regarding the trust account at 
that time and I indicated that the trust 
account had been closed out. 
Considering defendant's statements on cross-examina-
tion with regard to the status of the trust account at the time 
the June deposition was taken inconsistent with his representa-
tions in that same regard in the deposition, plaintiff called 
Brad Young, the court reporter who took the June deposition, as 
a rebuttal witness. Young verified the accuracy of the deposi-
tion and added his independent recollection of defendant's 
statement. At that point, plaintiff again moved to have the 
written excerpt from the deposition containing defendant's 
statement admitted as an exhibit corroborating Young's rebuttal 
testimony. Defendant interposed an objection to its admission 
on grounds that it did not constitute a prior inconsistent 
statement. The court ruled that it was the equivalent of a 
prior inconsistent statement and could be admitted as "an ini-
tial question of fact for the jury to determine." Defendant 
made no further objection, and the evidence was admitted as 
Exhibit P-l. 
Defendant contends on appeal that evidence that goes 
to "an initial question of fact" can only be presented as part 
of the case-in-chief. He did not, however, base his objection 
to the admission of Exhibit P-l on those same grounds at trial. 
Rather, his objection there was limited to the exhibit's admis-
sion as a prior inconsistent statement, which basis he apparently 
abandons on appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) 
there appears of record objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground or objec-
tion • • • • 
(Emphasis added.) In light of this rule, we hold that defen-
dant's present assertion of error in respect to the admission 
of Exhibit P-l is precluded. 
IV. THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN JURY DELIBERATIONS 
Defendant's final assignment of error is in respect 
to the trial court's permitting the jury to take Exhibit P-l (a 
partial deposition) with them into their place of deliberation. 
He argues that in so doing, the court violated Rule 17 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-17(k)) 
which provides in pertinent part: 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, 
the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits and 
papers which have been received as 
evidence, except depositions; and each 
-11- No. 18892 
juror may also take with him any notes of 
the testimony or other proceedings taken 
by himself, but none taken by any other 
person. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff's rejoinder to this argument is that there 
is nothing in the record that even suggests that Exhibit P-l 
went with the jury into deliberation and therefore the defen-
dant has failed in his burden of showing error. 
In the absence of any indication in the record to the 
contrary, we assume that all evidentiary exhibits were sent with 
the jury into deliberation. Such an assumption is appropriate 
here. We therefore conclude that error was committed as 
assigned by defendant. 
Our conclusion in this regard comports with decisional 
law in this as well as other jurisdictions. In State v. 
Solomon, this Court held that it was error to permit a por-
tion of a witness's transcript to be taken to the jury room, 
reasoning as follows: 
It is evident therefore that under the 
statutes such written testimony is not to 
be read by the jury in the jury room but 
is to be read to them in open court, sub-
ject to all objections to be made, the 
same as if the witness were present and 
testifying. The written record thereof 
should not be taken to the jury room where 
the jury might read it. A written instru-
ment, made an exhibit in the cause but not 
consisting of testimony of a witness in 
the case, may of course be taken to the 
jury room the same as maps, diagrams, and 
other exhibits. But the testimony of a 
witness is in a different category. Such 
is the provision of the statutes and the 
common law always excluded depositions and 
written testimony from being carried from 
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason 
why the court should depart from the well 
established rule. It may often happen 
that the testimony on one side is oral 
from witnesses produced before the jury, 
while the testimony for the other side on 
~ZT. 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807 (1939). See also State v~. 
Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092 (1961); State v. Payne, 199 
Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637, 
49 S.E. 719 (1905). 
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essential matters is in the form of depo-
sitions or in the transcript from testi-
mony at a previous hearing• If the hearing 
lasts for any length of time and the jury 
takes the depositions or transcript to be 
read and discussed while the oral evidence 
contra has in a measure faded from the 
memory of the jurors, it is obvious that 
the side sustained by written evidence is 
given an undue advantage* The law does 
not permit depositions or witnesses to go 
to the jury room. 
While we are convinced of the commission of the 
asserted error, we are unable to find in the record any objec-
tion thereto. In the absence of a proper and seasonably 
objection, an error such as this will be deemed waived. We 
hold, therefore, that defendant's failure to so object pre-
cludes assertion of this error. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge 
Oaks, Justice, having resigned, does not participate 
herein; Conder, District Judge, sat. 
23. 87 P.2d at 811. 
24. Stee State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475, 481 
(1947); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720, 221 S.E.2d 556, 558-59 
(1975); Shedden v. Stiles, supra note 22; People v. Dixon, 
37 111. 2d 416, 226 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1967); State v. Solomon, 
supra note 22. 
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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk, Supreme Court 
/ L Deputy Cle^k, 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Defendant Pro Se 
1068 N. Grand Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
377-6821 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : MOTION TO AMEND THE COURT'S 
MINUTE ENTRY DATED 
Plaintiff, : NOVEMBER 26, 1982 
vs. : 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, : Case No. 8354 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant and moves the above-entitled Court to amend its 
Minute Entry dated November 26, 1982. Section 77-35-32, Rule 32, Utah Rules • 
of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953) says, "The case file shall include copies 
of all minute entries of proceedings and orders made in that case." Section 
77-35-30, Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953) says in 
part (b), "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 
by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order." 
Section 77-35-22, Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953) 
says in part (e), "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." 
Defendant moves the Court to amend the Minute Entry in the following 
ways and for the reasons given: 
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1. The spelling of Defendantfs middle name should be corrected by 
deleting the second "H" to show the proper spelling of "Shepard", 
2. in the first and second paragraphs the term "Motion for Arrested 
Judgment" should be changed to properly reflect the accurate term of the 
motion made by Defendant, which is a "Motion for Arrest of Judgment." 
3. The ninth paragraph should be re-worded to accurately reflect 
the intent of the Court in a logical order, as follows: 
This is the time set for sentencing. The crime charged, 
"theft" is reduced to a Third Degree Felony. The maximum 
sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed 
five years and a fine of $5,000. Imposition of a fine and 
prison sentence is stayed and the Defendant is placed on 
probation for 2 years. Defendant is to work for the Utah 
County Sanity Administration one day a week for 50 weeks, 
with no charge to Utah County or to the State of Utah. Work 
arrangements shall be arranged through the Sanity Administra-
tion by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office. Resti-
tution shall be as determined in the Civil law suit re: 
Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. Defendant is on stiff 
probation for two years and is not to use liquor, drugs, or 
make any violation of the law during that period. 
As the ninth paragraph is presently worded, it is not only confusing, but it 
is also in violation of the proper procedure to be followed under the 
sentencing statute, Section 76-3-201, U.C.A. (1953) and could raise many 
questions about the legality of the procedure followed on November 26, 1982. 
The amended wording gets around the requirements of Section 76-3-201 and is 
proper procedure under Section 77-18-1, Criminal Procedure Code, U.C.A. (1953). 
The amended wording also better conforms to the standard form "Utah State 
Adult Probation and Parole Probation Agreement" which was furnished by the 
department of Adult Probation and Parole and which was signed by the Defendant 
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on December 1, 1982. 
Dated November 10, 1984. ^ —r^—~ y / / 
/! 'sit 1S 
JOipf S. DAVIS, Defendant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing 
"Amended Motion for a New Trial and Arrest of Judgment11 and "Motion to 
Amend the Court's Minute Entry Dated November 26, 1982" to the office of 
the Utah County Attorney, County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 this 13th 
day of November, 1984. 
JOffiUS. DAVIS 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Defendant Pro Se 
1068 N. Grand Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
377-6821 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : AMENDED MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL AND 
Plaintiff, : ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, : Case No. 8354 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant and amends his Motion for a New Trial and 
Arrest of Judgment dated November 24, 1982. This Amended Motion is made 
pursuant to Rule 15, U.R.C.P. and by the written consent of the Utah County 
Attorney's Office and the above entitled Court in the Stipulation and Order 
dated October 25, 1984. 
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is amended by the addition of 
the following point as an additional basis for the motion. 
POINT IIA 
It is reversible error for the jury to take Exhibit lfP-lff, a partial 
deposition, with them into deliberation. When the closing arguments were 
finished, the Bailiff took the jury to lunch and then immediately into their 
deliberations. This is shown by the minute entry of the Clerk and by the 
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transcript of the trial proceedings. 
The minute entry of the proceedings of the trial as kept by the Clerk, 
records the following applicable events: 
"Arguments concluded, the Defense and State counsel approached 
the bench and out of jury hearing said motion, the Defendant 
renewed its motion for mistrial. Motion denied. The Case is 
submitted to the jury at this time. Bailiff Willis Vincent took 
the jury to lunch at this time, and admonished to keep the jury 
together. Jury is to go directly to jury room to deliberate 
after lunch hour. Bailiffs were sworn in. 
"Deliberations began at 2:25 p.m. 
"At 8:00 p.m., the Jury was returned to the Courtroom at this 
time. (deliberation for 5 1/2 hours) Clerk called the roll 
and all jurors were present. Jury Foreman, Alan C. Cameron, 
stated the jury had reached a verdict." 
The transcript of the proceedings of the trial as recorded by the Court 
Reporter record the following events: 
THE COURT: The record should indicate we're outside the 
presence of the jury. 
MR. STANGER: Your Honor, I would again make a motion for 
mistrial on the basis that on four different 
occasions on the grounds that the Prosecutor 
is telling the jury of the fiduciary duty by 
lawyers and their clients. 
THE COURT: Well, your motion is denied. The Court feels that 
this is proper argument. 
MR. STANGER: Thank you. 
(After the matter was argued to the Court and jury by both 
sides, the jury retired to the jury room for the determination 
of a verdict.) 
(Whereupon a roll call was made of the jury and all the jurors 
were present.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, have you reached a verdict? 
FOREMAN: We have. 
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The deposition marked Exhibit P-1 was taken into the deliberations of 
the jury and weighed heavily in reaching a verdict, as shown in the attached 
affidavit of a member of the jury. 
Taking depositions into the jury room during deliberations is 
prohibited by statute in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
"Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with 
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and 
papers which have been received as evidence, except 
depositions; and each juror may also take with him any 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by 
himself, but not taken by any other person, (emphasis 
added) (Section 77-35-17(k), Utah Code Ann. (1953)). 
The basis for this statute has been well established law in Utah 
for more than forty years. In State v. Solomon, (1939) 96 Utah 500, 
87 P.2d 807, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished depositions as not 
being "documentary evidence11. The Court said: 
"But such testimony, even though taken by a reporter, 
transcribed and certified, is not documentary evidence 
to be received in writing and given to the jury." 
The reasoning of the Court in the Solomon case is set forth on 
page 811. It says: 
"A written instrument, made an exhibit in the cause but 
not consisting of testimony of a witness in the case, may 
of course be taken to the jury room the same as maps, 
diagrams, and other exhibits. But the testimony of a 
witness is in a different catagory. Such is the provision 
of the statutes and the common law always excluded 
depositions and written testimony from being carried from 
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason why the court 
should depart from the well established rule. It may often 
happen that the testimony on one side is oral from 
witnesses produced before the jury, while the testimony 
for the other side on essential matters is in the form of 
depositions or in the transcript from testimony at a 
previous hearing. If the hearing lasts for any length of 
time and the jury takes the depositions or transcript to 
- 4 -
be read and discussed while the oral evidence contra has 
in measure faded from the memory of the jurors, it is 
obvious that the side sustained by written evidence is 
given an undue advantage. The law does not permit depo-
sitions or witnesses to go to the jury room. Why should 
a witness be permitted to go there in the form of written 
testimony?" (citations omitted) 
It is likely that the jury might have reached a different verdict 
if they had not had the deposition with them for five and a half hours 
in deliberations. This constitutes good cause for the arrest of judgment 
in this case and the matter should be either dismissed or retried. 
The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is amended by the addition 
of the following point as an additional basis for the motion. 
POINT IIIA 
Under Section 77-35-24, Utah Code Ann. (1953), Rule 24, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, the Court may "grant a new trial in the interest 
of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party." The jury, in taking the depo-
sition into its deliberations, as alleged in the foregoing Point IIA was 
an error which had a substantial adverse effect on the Defendant. This 
fact situation falls squarely within the example discussed, supra, by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the Solomon case. The evidence by the State included 
the deposition which went to the jury deliberations, whereas the evidence 
by the Defendant was oral and none of it went with the jury in written 
testimony. As the Utah Supreme Court said, "it is obvious that the side 
(the State in this case) sustained by written evidence is given an undue 
advantage." By any interpretation, that means that the Defendant failed to 
receive a fair trial and the error is reversible. 
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The facts of this case, as described in the minute entry of the Clerk 
and the transcript of proceedings by the Court Reporter, and quoted in Point 
IIA, supra, show that there was also error and impropriety in the way the 
Court failed to control the issuance of the exhibits to the jury as they went 
into deliberations. The Court chose to recess the proceedings and send the 
jury to lunch immediately prior to the commencement of their deliberations• 
The State and the Defendant were both justified under the circumstances to 
assume that the Court would either take personal supervision or properly 
instruct the Bailiff, in the Judge's anticipated absence, to make sure that 
Rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was properly complied 
with, in that the jury was to be given the instructions of the court and 
all of the exhibits and papers which were received in evidence, but to exclude 
the depositions. The failure of the Court to responsibly handle its duty at 
a time when the proceedings were in recess and the parties were not present 
to personally observe which items were given to the jury, not only resulted 
in the error by the jury, but it also denied the Defendant of due process 
in this case at a critical time when actions were taken and decisions made 
which could and did result in a detriment to him. 
The third error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect 
upon the rights of the Defendant was in the way the Court handled the request 
by the jury that they be given a copy of Defendant's testimony. The record 
in this case includes a short note on a small piece of paper, signed by the 
jury foreman, requesting that the jury be given a copy of Defendant's testimony. 
The Court summarily denied the request, not in the presence of the parties or 
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their Counsel, and told the jury to use their best memory, and then directed 
the Clerk to attach the note to the jury instructions in the Court's file. 
The court record gives no other indication that the parties were notified 
of the request by the jury or the response by the Court, or that the parties 
had access to the Court's file after this incident and prior to the verdict 
by the jury. While the procedure followed by the Court may be allowable 
under the Rules, the request by the jury should have allerted the Court that 
the jury had some sort of document, such as the deposition, to which it was 
giving serious consideration, and the jury wanted to also consider the 
Defendant's explanation in written form. This is a fact which the Judge knew, 
or should have known at that point, but which he failed to disclose to the 
Defendant. This also resulted in a lack of due process for the Defendant and 
for which the Defendant should have been made aware. 
It is likely that the outcome of this case might have been different 
and in the Defendant's favor if these errors and improprieties had not been 
allowed to occur. In the interest of justice a new trial should be granted 
because of the substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant. 
Dated this 10th day of November, 1984. 
JOHN/g. DAVIS 
Defendant Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 8354 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
MRS. LINDA B. McDONALD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I was a member of the jury in the above entitled case in October 
of 1982. 
2. During our deliberations, the jury had with them and carefully 
revievred the partial deposition of the defendant labeled Exhibit P-1. 
3. The deposition labeled Exhibit P-1 weighed very heavily in my 
decision to find the defendant guilty. 
Dated this 16th day of November, 1984. 
•O- j"<~ " \ :±L 
LINDA 3. McDONALD 
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The foregoing Affidavit ol " * " l] MrMnniliJ WM s u b s c r i bed ainJ wmim 
l o r e me t h i s 16 th day of Novembt-
 t i .*84. 
/I , ' -. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
...ission LxBires: 
/ / *J&.Q 
f
 ~ /9f? 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Defendant Pro Se 
1068 W. Grand Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
377-6821 
'^ DEC 28 P;f 4: eg 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ON MOTIONS 
Case No. 8354 
COMES NOW the Defendant and requests that the above-entitled Court 
schedule a hearing on Defendant's motions at its earliest possible convenience 
in Manti, Utah. Due to the nature of the issues involved, this hearing should 
be held prior to, and independently of, any hearing on the issue of restitution. 
Dated this 26th day of December, 1984. 
j£f?N S. DAVIS', Defendant Pro Se 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Request for Hearing on Motions to the office of the Utah County Attorney, 
County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 this 26th day of December, 1984. 
wnty Attorney 
AYA/EB. WA1 SON 
ief Deputy 
P I L E D 
n-!w: 
£35 IAN k A;J 3- 2 3 
H..".[ R h 
- S C _ «;• l^ N ; : T V 
rnone 
(801)373-5510 
Crimitiai Division 
Ext, 320 
Civil Division 
Ext, 220 
OFFICE OF 
Itaff &uuniy urneu 
County Building, Room 107 
Provof Utah 84601 
January 2, 198 5 
Carole .Mellor 
Clerk of the Coui t 
Sixth District Court 
Sanpete County Co urt House 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Re: State vs. Davis 
Dear Carole, 
Per your request, this shall confirm the nearing date in 
Manti on January 30, 19 85/ at 2:00 P.M. in the ahnvp-captioneri 
case. 
ALL T. WOOTTON 
?EVEN B. KILLPACK 
Deputy Utah County Attorn 
SP-F i -a, 
cc hn DaviF 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SANPETS STATE OF UTAH 
O ' ) 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge
 (UTAH COUNTY MATTER) 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
Date January 30. 1985 
Case No. 8354 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
Noall Wootton.-Ut-ab County Attorney /^^^^^ 
Steven 3. Killpack, Deputy Utah County Attv 
John Shepard David Pro Se 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court 
AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
and 
MOTION TO AMEND COURT'S MINUTE 7.NT3Y 
) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
) CRIMINAL 
) ADOPTION 
)OTHER 
A kfe- ^ ^ ^ V ^T^^ i *^£Zf - CUA^JL*-^ frs^t^ «-*<L-
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•^ u:, 
< ^ UU^rt^J^JL^ r {{^^J~~{l*-<L^^Zt-*Sf—<l 1 ir\^ •lA^cccJU^ 
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^4-~*-JL-~^? 7 v Ct ^ ASiXft cb. A'4L ZL^LLZ 
r^A^-j^-^Lf-r^,2$~7'?. -la*,. ^<L<*< ^r'^ •O^ 
i±A.-d/ a .d-^jz—L^ A^^*-Xuz y^AjLatt/Ljz^* ) ^L ^ /j( iTTc-H^^ £ 
WANDA BARTHOLOMEW 
Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
/ I . I 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY-OF _, _STATE OF UTAH fad &.^*r**» q - ,/s 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge ^ a u . . ^ ^ & °fJLLZ. 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter Case No I&jLzL 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
~A-4J-<-^-sI 
yjL£es&-**~a-*^T~ 
(Counsel Present) 
\jL£f$jsi<£. 3/^-taL-/^aa-ft—* 
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Proceedings Before the Court 
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DIVORCE 
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SUPPLEMENT \ ' ORDER 
PROBATE 
HIMINAL 
\ D O P T ! r v 
^THEP 
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t 
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Court Cleik Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF - • - ' - - - STATE OF UTAH 
_1
 \ DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
Date. - > — > , , -j , - T / 
Case No. 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
r • 
^ 
— 
"Ji 
^:z o;.: :. 
i7.?x\j : 
' \ -* 
V -
: ,vi3, 
? L - 1 A . 
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- - • -
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COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
r cb- :^hj-ar i :).avil "^ 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court ) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
) CRIMINAL 
) ADOPTION 
) OTHER 
Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURI 
COUNTY OF 
ri < £,0. *s/ 
I M )N V T1BBS, Judge 
l" Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
.STATE OF UTAH 
Pate :_ 
<*- NO 
TITI.W (Parties Present) COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
-c *>-*'/.' 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court ) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
) CRIMINAL 
) ADOPT ON 
) OTHER 
Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Defendant Pro Se 
1068 N. Grand Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
377-6821 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : OBJECTIONS TO 
Plaintiff, : PROPOSED ORDERS 
vs. : 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS : Case No. 8354 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, John Shepard Davis, and enters his objections 
to the proposed order in reference to the hearing held on November 26, 1982, 
as follows: 
1. The proposed order cannot be filed because such filing does 
not conform to the time requirements of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice 
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah. 
Rule 2.9 is applicable in this instance because RuLe 3.1 of the same 
Rules clearly states, "These rules shall govern the practice and procedure 
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah in all 
matters not specifically covered by the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure or 
Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court." 
Ruxe «.*-* i " i v r " T - i M -T i l ings b ^ a m f, rounsel fi?r t h e > a r -
u a r t i e s o b t a i n i n g t h e r . i 1 ^ : <-~h <T - i i* . i~ f i f t e e n •'• ?i * : ! 
. : > - ' t j . ^ o p o s e u ;.» rvie r , 
judgment i d e c r e e in :on t o r m i t v w i t h :w r u l i n g ! Ic a r o v i s i o n i s nade i c r 
e x t e n d i n g t h e t : ^ e w i t h i n , which a p r o p o s e d o r d e r r -. 
- . ) s a v s . • . . , ; ,e p r o p o s e d F i n d i n g s , J u d g m e n t s , 
a n d / o r O r d e r s s n a i l he s e r v e o or. a p p o s i n g c o u n s e l b e f o r e b e i n g p r e s e n t e d 
{"-' f*ie (xourt tcr s i g n a t u r e . . • ' • • * I J o l l c e o i 
- i j n s c n e r e L j o i ^ . ^ ^ ^ujivu LI «u o f ;ie . 'ouft arc! c o u n s e l w i t h i n 
f i v e (.0) days a f t e r s e r v i c e . ' Mr. K i l l p a c k ' s l e t t e r *: t h e o u r t i s i.r 
t h e 17 t h * in-. . • * ' c a t e s show t h a t s u c h m a i l i n g s 
*°n c o u n s e l were not **iaue unr : J t h e }2n •>: I.-, T he r e i s n o t h i n g vr i n d i c a t e 
t h a t such m a i l i n g s t ^ oounseJ v e r e r r i ' - " * . ' • n I: . 
i:%v :1
 ^-l-boe C o n s t r u c t i o n Company v . 
S t a k e r P a v i n g and C o n s t r u c t ion , bbJ. P . Jd 84 3 . den * - v i «•' t he ' — - P ot 
c o n f o r r l t v w i t h Rule L* 'pose-1 r d e r was 
s e r v r p p o s i n g c o u n s e l .-,tt: ueiv ^ r ; . i^ b e i n g sen ' ;> t h e • ^ u r t The 
c o u r t s i g n e d t h e . - rde r s r i - i t h e e x p i r a t i o - * rhe f i v e da^ 
Supreme C o u r t p< tl: n s ]:: r : cediii •< . ^ : - . u< : b e c a u s e ..c ; , -~ 
Uv>es no*" s p e c i i v * wdiLing p e r i o d D e t o r e t h e j^id^e can ^ i gn t h e Oroer 
That :s whv i t S^TH '"n,^ r e q u i r e m e n t -\ w f l ! • - i tdi ng 
« _• . i _ j . . a r i . ' ' 
hi tne above-entitled case, neither the requirements or '" ^ (a) nor 
2.9(b) were met by tne L . ^ :-. seu :r.ier was not 
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filed within fifteen (15) days after the November 26, 1982 hearing, when 
the court reporter's notes were probably still available. At the hearing on 
January 30, 1985 the assistant county attorney said that he did not understand 
that a written order was necessary, which is hardly believable since Rule 2.9 
applies to all of the Districts in the State of Utah. Nevertheless, at the 
January 30, 1985 hearing the court made it perfectly clear that the minute 
entry did not constitute the courtfs order and the court ordered him to 
prepare such an order. Now, only one week shy of six months after that hearing, 
and after his withdrawal from the case, he is trying to file the written order. 
The County Attorney's office has previously taken a position of strict 
conformity with the rules. At the January 30, 1985 hearing, the Defendant was 
asking to be allowed to file a motion for a new trial. In response, the 
assistant county attorney put strong emphasis on the necessity for strick 
conformity to the time requirements under the rules. He said: 
. . . itfs the State's position that you have a very specific 
Rule, Rule 24. It's in 77-35-24 but, in any event, the Rule provides 
that you can only file in a criminal case for a new trial up to ten 
days after sentence is imposed and it's our position that the sentence 
was imposed or ordered, an order of sentence was made, and that the 
time period began to run in accordance with Rule 24 on November 26, 1982. 
I think the Court file will reflect the Minute Entry on that particular 
date indicating that sentence was imposed by the Court and you just 
can't get around the rule. . . . Now the rule allows time during that 
ten day period, to extend the time period if that's appropriate; however, 
no motion was made to extend the time period in this particular case. . . 
Basically, it's the State's position that the provision of the statute 
is clear and that there has not been compliance with the statute and 
it's not properly before the Court. 
The court agreed with that position in January of 1985, because it said 
to the Defendant, "Well, I disagree with you so the Motion for New Trial is 
denied because it was not made timely within the time after I imposed sentence 
which is on the date as set forth in the Minute Entry of November 26, 1982." 
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That same position M strict convormirv ' » • i-e ''i^ e requirements of the rules 
11 1 I'M: .illowed to be 
tiled because . v .- ^  . . v.e^i ci nt
 x 
. w'» _ i L _v.iL.ier -We V.UUIL l e p u r t e r ' 5 ties 
••r i r a n s c r i i r >' ' i. H e a r i n g can *;t !-o<mc * ^ •» -o^osed or - ipr f \erefore, 
..earing «w Januarv lour strongly denounced the accuracy 
01 the Yjlnute -.;;: rv as a reflection >* -h^ . ^ * * o verbal order, ' ! : -
transcript o; -he hearing .-•". 
January JO, 1985? 
Alright, let me just indicate right off the bat. i 
sonft consider a Minute Entry as my sentence. The sentence 
is what I stated on the record and that should be clear and 
I ' l l be cound on whatever is on the record, but I don't thinK ' ^ 
obligated m a Minute linrry because that ' s a l l a Clerk is 
writing down and what their feelings of what I'm doing i s , in..: 
i t has no legal significance at a l l . So, i t ' s my practice ana 
I thought this had been done that the State shall prepare an 
order in -^nformitv \v : n "he ordt-r F gave off the Bench 
_ f that hasn't been- ,i, ie, the-c '^u'd better ger rs 
of ine transcript and prepare an order accordingly and i:;at 
will be what is on the record and I'm not going to s tar t 
amending a Clerk's Minute Rnt-rv so that ' s lust iiirtins :* 
- -~ '.auie ....Li
 t,r :o.;es an order 
ot the Con"-* 
Tutrix - u , J,J,. Lt ?s 3 part of the record 
: JL it i sn * ~ f he 
Apparently you don't have an order, as i t i s n ' t in che n . e , 
and i t ' s never been prepared and I would instruct the County 
Attorney's Office to prepare an order in conformity with vh^t 
I stated in Court., 
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ThatTs right, so if you disagree with what my order was, 
youfd better get a copy of the transcript and check it out 
because that's what ITm going to be bound by and not by what 
some Clerk's said I said. It might be a different clerk every 
day, you know. 
Maybe it was (my clerk) writing it but I don't agree with 
everything she writes frankly* 
Once again I thought there had been an order signed but it's 
your responsibility or the responsibility of the State's attorney 
to prepare the written order so far as I'm concerned and that 
order should be prepared and submitted to the Court for signature. 
If it hasn't been done, it should be done. 
For the purpose of the record the Court does not consider, 
and let there be no question about this, a minute entry made by 
a clerk as being the order of the Court because the clerks are not 
trained, they don't take it down by shorthand or verbatim. Sometimes 
they don't hear exactly what I've said properly and they've 
just not been trained and they vary and they also sometimes 
don't understand the legal words that are used. They put their 
own views on it and the Court does not consider a minute entry 
binding as a Court order. The order is what the Court said on the 
record at the time of sentencing and that's all I can say about: it. 
By the foregoing statements of this Court, the Minute Entry cannot be 
used as the basis of the Court's written Order. The use of one's own memory 
as the basis for preparing an accurate memorialization of the Court's verbal 
ruling thirty-two (32) months after the hearing is highly questionable. At 
the hearing on January 30, 1985, the Court indicated that his memory was not 
entirely accurate as to exactly what was said. Defendant, with supporting 
documentation of the Probation Order, which was signed five (5) days after 
the November 26, 1982 hearing, moved the Court to make some technical 
adjustments in the wording and was rejected by the Court as having no proper 
foundation. 
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-u p r o p o s e d o r d e r - i n a c c u r a t e *n , ime a s o e c t s -*yid does n o t 
• . - n j i i e . ' ^ ; .,; t h e 
^ i i t d i , L i n g . » - '..-'t* c a s e * a s - g a i n m i s s p e l l e d t h e 
Defend-in' - 'ri1 1* * - - "3 ' *•" ~ * * *" ' •* " n ^ P ^ - I I * < <<I,.H il 
. . . i a a r , ^ .: JL i- eni. ry 
makes s p e c i f i c ^ r ' c : ^ 1 ^ **• - s e n e cf t h e i ' f i * *; i o i n p the p r e -
s e n t e n c e in\-*~ * 1111 i I. urn 11111 
P a r o l e Ttr . *.-.<J oi^iuudi i£e;> .M.^ sLaLemeut i t • :.L- e a r i n g , which must: h a v e 
added ^ *"^e f i n d i n g s or t h e - ^ n r f np^i--.•,-.*. -.;
 s T a d e of h im i n t h e 
• - - . , J i . - , . , ; . it. r e s t i t u t i o n w . , 
De a e t e r m i n e d bv trie c i v j i v i ' u n . J-t : -e i e a r i n g on fanuarv UK 19 85 t h e 
C o u r t T-a fie i *• :-*r ' l , a L he v T 
t r a n s c ^ i . i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h p , u ^ r ^ J , , , a JM * - ' . * h i s i s -nv i n t e n t 
a n d , om.e ife . -i o S.i» K r n,i<r*n - * r a n s c r i h e d , - ^i -*•»•? „L 
«: ^:,c . - • I t u t i on 
u/ds: . . i e r e va t . : « ^ * * e n d i n g o r trie p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g what t h e 
i n d e b t e d n e s s wa<= *°d *' + ^-* • —, ••» ,-- _ . l x 
. .,.. <_., J e t e n.iiiied *& u i i. •? r o i n t 
a p p a r e n t l y , " 
Is" ^s D e f e n d a n t ' - r e c o l l e c t i o n :'• f e used 4 
> • - - ' C . - ii'*, -i* liiieuaeu . u s r e c o l l e c t i o n , as 
o u t l i n e d i n D e f e n d a n t ' s -notion t\* imec- *> f hp J a n u a r y "*0% 1985 h e a r i n g . -» 
tha t : inipojs if tf.io •- • - , . . . . . . • : ' • - - e r e n a a n t was pla^c-o on 
probation. This position is supported cv the wording ,?f the signed probation 
agreement• 
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4. The proposed order cannot be filed because it does not conform 
to the statutory requirements of section 76-3-201 U.C.A. (1953) as amended. 
That statute, which governs sentencing in criminal cases, only allows for 
five different categories of sentence, and the proposed order does not 
specify which of those are included. The sentencing statute also classifies 
restitution as being in addition to the sentence, not a part of it. When 
the sentencing court orders restitution, he must first make a finding that 
there are pecuniary damages suffered by the victim. Pecuniary damages can 
only include special damages and not general or punitive damages, which may 
be included in a civil judgment. The court must also limit those pecuniary 
damages to the amount that the victim could actually recover in a civil action 
against the defendant. 
If the court finds such pecuniary damages, he must make his reasons 
a part of the court record as to why restitution is appropriate or is not 
appropriate. He must also show that he has taken into consideration several 
specific items which are listed in the statute. 
If the Defendant objects to imposition of restitution, the amount, or 
the distribution of restitution, which this defendant did then and does now, 
the Court must allow the Defendant a full hearing on the issue of restitution 
at the time of sentencing. 
These requirements have not been met, and therefore, the written order 
does not meet the statutory requirements if the order for restitution is to 
be included. 
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5. The last written order of the Court in the file extends the 
period of probation to April 1, 1985. The State's failure to enter a subsequent 
written order making any further extensions of the probation period prior to 
April 1, 1985, has allowed the probationary period and the court's jurisdiction 
to terminate as a matter of law. 
If the county attorney's office wants to retain jurisdiction, then it 
has the obligation to enter a written order to preserve that jurisdiction. 
If it wants to obtain a judgment of conviction, it needs to prepare it timely, 
and not be delinquent while memories fade and transcripts are lost before 
it tries to enter the written order. That is granting the State a judgment 
without due process, especially when there is evidence that the verbal ruling 
was not in conformity with the written order which was submitted much later. 
6. Defendant again raises his objection to jurisdiction which was 
raised at the hearing on January 30, 1985. The 1984 amendment to section 
77-18-1 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, provides that following eighteen (18) months 
on compliance with the terms of probation, then probation is automatically 
terminated as a matter of law. That statute also provides that if there is 
restitution still unpaid as the only remaining item, jurisdiction of that 
matter is transferred to the civil court for collection. In January of 1985 
this court indicated that this amendment to the statute does not govern this 
present case because the sentence was issued prior to the effective date of 
the amendment. Defendant now contends that since the written order has not 
been filed prior to the effective date of the amendment, that it is governed 
by the amendment, and therefore, probation and jurisdiction have terminated 
as a matter of law. 
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7. As objection to the proposed order from the hearing dated 
January 30, 1985, Defendant incorporates foregoing paragraphs #1 and #5. 
Defendant also challenges the accuracy of the order. Most notably, the 
order does not even indicate the date of the hearing, which was January 
30, 1985. It also fails to even mention the issue of automatic termination 
of probation, as discussed in the foregoing paragraph #6. There is a 
transcript of that hearing, covering twenty-two (22) pages. A careful 
review of that transcript will indicate that the three paragraphs included 
in the proposed order are not sufficient to cover the rulings of the court. 
DATED this 31st day of July, 1985. 
S. DAVIS 
defendant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Objections to Proposed Orders to the office of the Utah County Attorney at 
the Courthouse in Provo, Utah this 31st 
> A R Y J ANDERSON C o T 5 - ^ c e ' 
JERIL B WILSON Ccn-r i« one*-
J ONFL MINER CcnT'S* c~e<-
RONALD M SMITH Assessor 
NOALL T WOOTTON Arcmey 
EcWOOD L SUNDBERG Aucf to' 
W.LLIAM F HUISH 0 ' k 
NINA B RE1D Re-cder 
MACK HOLLEY Shenff 
CLYDE R NAYLOR f^g nee, 
STANLEY H WALKER Treasurer 
<VTA.fr 
C
^ ^ T ' 
State of Utah 
COUNTY BUILDING • PROVO, UTAH 84601 • TELEPHONE 601 373-5510 
July 17, 1985 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Sixth District Court 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main Street 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Re: State of Utah v. John Shephard Davis 
Dear Judge Tibbs: 
In January of this year I terminated my employment at the 
Utah County Attorney's office. It has subsequently come to my 
attention that no one has prepared the Orders in accordance with 
your directive at the last hearing on January 3 0 , 1985. 
Evidently a misunderstanding did occur between myself and my 
successor in the County Attorney's office and I apologize for the 
inconvenience and for the oversight. 
At th 
of the tra 
sentencing 
hearing, I 
the Court 
transcript 
of the Cou 
cannot pre 
Affidavit 
Entry on N 
set forth 
Court on t 
document in 
Affidavit 
as indicat 
e last hearing, your Honor directed me to obtain a copy 
nscript of the actions of the Court at the time of 
on November 26, 1982. Immediately after the Court 
discussed the matter with C. Howard Watkin, C.S.R., 
Reporter who was present on that date. Evidently the 
of the hearing was left by Mr. Watkin with the Clerk 
rt in Provo. However, Mr. Watkin's transcription 
sently be located. For that reason, I have enclosed an 
generally verifying the facts contained in the Minute 
ovember 26, 1982 and also the contents of the matters 
in the proposed Order memorializing the orders of the 
hat date. I have also enclosed a proposed Order 
g what occurred at the last hearing. Copies of the 
and of both orders have been forwarded to the Defendant 
ed on the Mailing Certificates. 
H o n o r a b l e Don 
July 1 7 , 1985 
Page Two 
V, Tibbs 
Charlene Barlow, Deputy Utah County Attorney, will represent 
the State of Utah on any further proceedings in this case. 
However, I will make any appearances with her, either as co-
counsel or as a witness upon the Court's request. Thank you for 
your attention to these matters. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
^^yjt&n 
^ St e v e n B .' k i 11 p a c k 
SBK:kjr 
Approval as to form: 
(' l- - -T^L \.^ 
th ar1ene Barlow 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Ronald Stanger, 55 East Center, P r o v o , Utah, 
84601 and to John Shepherd Davis, 1068 North Grand Circle, Provo 
Utah, 84601, by pjacing said copy in the U. S. M a i l , postage 
prepaid, this ^ 
> I a z} n 
JM d ay of J u l y , 1985. 
OF ml: S,'l-Myy *
 r.;,.r 
!5S5 C
" -2 A1 /,:
 3 f 
NOALL T. W00TT0N 
Utah County A t to rney 
Room 107 
Utah County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 373-5510 ext 320 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JOHN SHEPHARD DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 8354 
) 
:ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK deposes and states on his oath as 
follows: 
1. That he was the Prosecuting Attorney in the above 
captioned case. 
2. That he was present on November 26, 1982 at the time of 
sentencing in the above captioned case. 
3. That the matters set forth in the Minute Entry on file 
with the Court and dated November 26, 1982 are true and accurate 
to the best of his recollection. 
4. That the proposed Order filed concurrently with this 
Affidavit accurately memorializes the order of sentence which 
occurred on November 26, 1982 to the best of his recollection. 
5. That no transcript of the sentencing hearing on 
November 26, 1982 is presently in existence to his knowledge. 
DATED th is jf day of <£&H£/. , 1985. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ ^ ~ d a y of 
_ />/// 4 , 1985 
/ 
Notary Pub 1 i c ' , 
Residing at: sS/fa/i/sh 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit to John Shephard Davis at 1068 North 
Grand Circle, Provo, Utah, 84601; Ronald Stanger at 55 East 
Center, Provo, Utah, 84601; Richard Lindsey, District Agent, 
Adult Probation and Parole, 184 West 200 South, Provo, Utah, 
84601; and Joe Tesch, 30 North Main, #2, Heber City, Utah, 84032 
O Or 
by placing said copy in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 
, 198 <T . Outlay of QliAj 
?j a 
^hMM^g£& 
S e c r e t a r y 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
Room 107 
Utah County Building 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 373-5510 ext 320 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN SHEPHARD DAVIS, ] 
Defendant. 
i O R D E R 
} Case No. 8354 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 
Defendant's Motions to Amend the Court's Minute Entry dated 
November 26, 1982 and upon the Defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial, the Defendant appearing in person and representing himself 
and the State of Utah being represented by Steven B. Killpack. 
The parties previously entered into a Stipulation and Order 
extending Defendant's probation to April 1, 1985. The Court 
conducted hearings on the Motion. Both parties addressed the 
Court. The Court being fully advised in the premises now hereby 
makes and enters the following: 
O 
O R D E R 
1. The Defendant's probation is continued indefinitely 
until the Court makes a final determination regarding the amount 
of restitution owing by the Defendant in this case and until the 
Defendant completes payment of such restitution. The Court 
directs the parties and the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole to set the matter for a restitution hearing at such time 
that the civil litigation arising out of the facts in this case 
is concluded. 
2. The Defendant's Motions'to Amend the Minute Entry dated 
November 26, 1982 and for a New Trial are denied. 
3. The State is directed to prepare an Order memorializing 
the Order of Sentence entered by the Court on November 26, 1 9 8 2 . 
DATED this _ 2 £ S day of , 198 <, . 
VkK . ^ A KA^^^ 
DwuJ^. T i b b s 
D i s t r t^t^ J iidlj e 
Approval as to Form: 
John Shephard Davis 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order to John Shephard Davis at 1068 North Grand 
Circle, Provo, Utah, 84601; Ronald Stanger at 55 East Center, 
Provo, Utah, 84601; Richard Lindsey, District Agent, Adult 
Probation and Parole, 184 West 200 South, Provo, Utah, 84601; and 
Joe Tesch, 30 North Main, #2, Heber City, Utah, 84032 by placing 
said copy in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, this -Q-^CJday of 
JJ - // / 198 ^ . 
/ 
Secretary / 
T. Wootton 
County Attorney 
107 
County Building 
, Utah 84601 
hone: 373-5510 ext. 320 
ley for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
.HEPHARD DAVIS j 
i O R D E R 
I Case No. 8354 
Defendant, ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for 
cing on November 26, 1982. The Defendant was previously 
guilty by a jury of theft, a second degree felony, on 
r 20, 1982. Defendant was represented by his attorney, 
Stanger, and the State was represented by Deputy Utah 
Attorney, Steven B. Killpack. The Defendant moved the 
for a new trial and also for an arrest of judgment. The 
conducted a hearing upon the Motions of the Defendant. 
the hearing and argument upon the Motions, both Motions 
snied. 
le Court then conducted a sentencing hearing. At the 
:ing hearing, both Noal1 T. Wootton, Utah County Attorney, 
"'"^r.-s-X^:^'1: rv.v: 
CCJ
 -2 MIU 
.'?/.». 
//••3/ 
and Steven B. Killpack, Deputy Utah County Attorney addressed the 
Court regarding sentencing for the State of Utah. Both Ronald 
Stanger, Attorney for Defendant and the Defendant, John Shephard 
Davis, addressed the Court on behalf of the Defendant. The Court 
also considered the report previously filed by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole. A copy of the report from Adult 
Probation and Parole was made available to the Defendant and his 
attorney. 
Whereupon, the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
made and entered the following: 
ORDER OF SENTENCE 
1. Pursuant to Section 76-3-402 of the Utah Code, the 
Defendant is sentenced under the next lower category of offense. 
Accordingly, a judgment of conviction is entered against the 
Defendant for a third degree felony theft. 
2. Defendant is sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term, not to exceed five y e a r s . 
3. The Defendant is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of 
$ 5 , 0 0 0 . 
4. The fine and prison sentence are both stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation for a period of two years on the 
following terms and conditions: 
a. Defendant is to work for the Utah County Sanity 
Administrator one day a week for 50 weeks without compensation. 
FILED 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT5 " j . " 2 ",
 iR 
COUNTY OF _J>XUL>**U>Z£~ STATE OF UTAH H i f ': m 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter ~ P^V" 3 -
E S T A T    ^ 
Date. 
r Case No. 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
^ 
COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
i>~~o-e-*<D 
2~4A-dC.JUoLs(~ . 
MINUTE ENTRY 
<£ roceedings Before the Court ( r^ <*2J <*-»"£- ^ ^<^J 
) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
() CRIMINAL 
( ) ADOPTION 
( )OTHER 
<#..- £ &*<A • < ' L 
A>:<ro /?. *X7. 
(UA-^L/X. J/fi. ,/<. *<7-c^ ^ ^^ytc^C^ £*- i 
//2**4i*t~?<* 
tSg^—si. ^i ** A 6~YA Sf- •it 
*-^—c< 
, ^ < £ r /rC L. -f L +-JJL JL 
/ 
~^fh/j^J^ cQf&&k£&£& 
•Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order to John Shephard Davis at 1068 North Grand 
Circle, Provo, Utah, 84601; Ronald Stanger at 55 East Center, 
Provo, Utah, 84601 Richard Lindsey, District Agent, Adult 
Probation and Parole, 184 West 200 South, Provo, Utah, 84601; and 
Joe Tesch, 30 North Main, #2, Heber City, Utah, 84032, by placing 
said copy in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, this Qry/'^'aay of 
, 198 
~/?f/''/-y! c^V 
Secretary 
n • •* < 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Room 1Q7, County Building 
Provo, Utah 846C1 
373-5510 Ext. 320 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , : O R D E R 
V S . 2 
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, : Case No. 8354 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs on October 1, 1985 on defendant's Request for Hearing on 
Defendant's Objections to Proposed Orders. Defendant was 
present, acting pro se, and the State was represented by Deputy 
Utah County Attorney Charlene Barlow. 
The Court heara arguments from both parties and askea for 
comment from Steven B. Killpack, Utah County Sanity 
Administrator. Defenaant reneweo his motions for a new trial ana 
for arrest of 3udgment which were again aenied. 
The Court, being fully aavisea in the premises, maae and 
enterec the following: 
FILED 
Ec5 OCT 10 /.;!{T; 22 
• J . I ; R.K 
V<V 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT W5CC1-2 /nil: 31 
COUNTY OF SANPETE 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
.STATE OF UTAH -..v./-M4S 
Date. nr.T, i , 19K5 
Case No. 8354 (UTAH COUNTY MATTER 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
VS 
COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
Charlene Barlow, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
P l a i n t i f f , r - fe^ fc^j•£$/%%£ Q+T-«Zjf2&Z* 
: C 
JOHN SHEPHERD DAVIS, 
Defendant. 
John S. DAvis, Pro Se 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED ORDERS 
) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
XX) CRIMINAL 
) ADOPTION 
)OTHER 
dJ^^^^. £5*yr/y*-,*J 
z^< y9?^7~7h. 
& ; <",</< frr*" / ^ 
•ecst 
^^A.JJK] 7% 3. £>\*. Q~^.(£j! A,<> c& 
\. *^i dj./i j siP 
JL^. Lt-<M-< ^ tn 
„<^J? tf^^j 
•^JL .<~-~r?/L-*L&- Zx^u d 7/jfcnL 
t' 
WANDA BARTHOLOMEW 
Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
• i q i - o. i 
8. A restitution hearing is scheduled for October 28, 
1985 at lfc:06 A.M. in Manti, Utah, at which time the plaintiff 
will present the aocuments and affidavits to the Court and the 
defendant will present any legal basis he has for cisagreeing 
with the oocuments and amounts. 
DATED this / _day of October, 1985. 
*ffE--COURT: 
Approval as to Form: 
JGKk SH EPARD DAVIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order to John S. Davis, Defendant Pro Se, at 
lfc/68 North Grana Circle, Provo 84604 this _jj[^£__day of October, 
1985. 
V /jL(t>ljt'k£ 
/ 
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ORDER OF SENTENCE 
1. Defendant's renewed motions for new trial and arrest 
of judgment are denieG. 
2. Defendant's objection to the Proposed Orders is 
ceniec. 
3. The Orders signed July 23, 19b5, which memorialized 
the Court's orders of November 26, 15b2 anc January 30, 1985, are 
orderec fileo and are the Orders ot the Court in tnese matters. 
4. The supervision of the Department of Aault Probation 
ana Parole over this defendant is terminated except for the 
matter of restitution. 
5. The Court retains jurisdiction over determining 
restitution in this matter. 
6. The Utah County Attorney's Office is orcered to 
contact tne victims anC furnish the Court witn any and all 
documents bearing on the victims' restitution claims, plus 
affidavits that these claims are from final orders and any 
balance owing to the victims from the defendant. 
7. The Utah County Attorney's Office is to provide 
copies of tnese documents and affidavits to tne defendant within 
fifteen oavs. 
-2-
SIXTH JUDICIAL piSTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF 
"7 
_STATE OF UTAH 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter j /j 
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TJourt Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 5 0CT 29 l' 3 '3 
COUNTY OF ^/ZJ^ STATE OF UTAH : ' ' ; ; / w V , ! i f-h 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter 
Date. f^l 
Case No. / L f ^ ^ 
TITLE (Parties Present) 
v//^- zku £ 7-7 9/7^ 
A. 
-& 
ff^^ZMs 
'VLZ, \£* 
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COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
• f 
/?~ts-l*^> j%U^ 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court 
%sCSM.
 J /^z. 
) DIVORCE 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) PROBATE 
X ) CRIMINAL 
.) ADOPTION 
^ ) O T H E R 
,&.£>• Y,k? *-•/'<• ft c <,?(*/.<. 4L f^t^U •^y. /?. V f « ^ ^ -*L<d£ *T /hrt. 
/ / 
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'^f.ljaoit^^ <£i<jL/o.YSt* S3.. 
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/ 1 , - r /-/. «£i=- >2> .£3&S~ / i / 
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Court Clerk Don V. Tibbs, District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS, 
Defendant, 
This matter came on for hearing on October 28, 1985, before 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. Defendant was present pro se and the 
State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Charlene 
Barlow. 
The court heard arguments and received exhibits from both 
parties regarding the questions of restitution. The court also 
indicated that it had received a letter from an attorney 
representing one of the victims and allowed the parties to read 
and respond to the letter. 
The court, being fully advised in the premises, made and 
entered the following: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The defendant has complied with the conditions of 
probation as imposed by the court on November 26, 1982, except 
for the payment of restitution. 
2. The court stated at the November 26, 1982, sentencing 
that the question of restitution would be determined by the civil 
O R D E R 
Criminal No. 8354 
3. The court-finds that the civil litigation as contained 
in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 as presented at this restitution 
hearing does fix the amount of restitution owing by defendant in 
this case. 
4. The court specifically excepts from this order the 
amounts listed in the exhibits as punitive damages. Punitive 
damages cannot be and are not ordered as restitution in this 
criminal matter. 
5. The court finds the restitution owed by defendant to be 
$73,461.45 as of November 26, 1982. 
6. That amount is the amount of money belonging to Charley 
Joseph and Joseph Mascaro which was in the defendant's trust 
account and wrongfully used by defendant. 
7. The court finds no advantage to keeping defendant on 
supervised probation. 
ORDER OF SENTENCE 
1. Supervised probation for the defendant's terminated. 
2. The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $73,461.45 
plus statutory interest on that amount from November 26, 1982, to 
the victims, Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. 
Dated this day of November, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
DON V. TIBBS 
Judge 
Approved as to form 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order 
to John S. Davis, defendant, at 1068 North Grand Circle, Provo 
84604, this ^QtT day of October, 1985. 
Secretary 
v///ftmffsd 
This brief dated this 21st day of February, 1986. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/ 
/'-•U V 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally deliver four (4) copies 
of the foregoing Brief to the office of the Utah Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 21st day of February, 1986. 
~7~ " " '' 
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